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THE NEW RACIAL JUSTICE:
MOVING BEYOND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE TO
ACHIEVE EQUAL PROTECTION
EMILY CHIANG†
ABSTRACT
Since handing down Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development, the United States Supreme Court has significantly curtailed the ability of
plaintiffs to bring disparate impact claims under the Equal Protection Clause. Many academics continue to talk about the standards governing intent and disparate impact. Some
recent scholarship recognizes that reformers on the ground have shifted away from equalitybased claims altogether. This Article contends that civil rights advocates replaced the old
equal protection framework some time ago and that they did so deliberately and with great
success. It expands upon and refines the strategy shift some scholars have identified, with a
particular focus on racial inequality, the foundation on which equal protection rests. It does
so by focusing on three particularly timely reform movements: indigent defense reform, the
fight to end the school-to-prison pipeline, and challenges to immigration-related laws. The
Article uses these various reform movements to identify and analyze the true breadth of the
new racial justice reformers have wrought.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Racial inequality endures in America. Whether the disparities—in
education,1 employment,2 incarceration,3 or any number of other areas4—constitute inequity may be a matter of debate, but the fact of
continued inequality is not.5 And yet, the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is increasingly ill suited to address this
state of affairs. In the wake of decisions such as Washington v. Davis6
and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,7
litigation seeking racial justice on the basis of disparate impact theories
of discrimination under the Constitution has been all but foreclosed.8
A number of commentators have noted that those seeking to address inequality have had to accommodate a Court and culture in1. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.1.
2. According to data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the unemployment
rate for African Americans in 2011 and 2012 was roughly double than what it was for
whites. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB.
STAT., http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat05.htm (last modified Feb. 5, 2013). As others have
noted, these statistics grossly underestimate the true African American unemployment
rate, because they do not include prisoners. BECKY PETTIT, INVISIBLE MEN: MASS
INCARCERATION AND THE MYTH OF BLACK PROGRESS 52-53 (2012); BRUCE WESTERN,
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 97 (2006); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 229 (The New
Press rev. ed. 2012) (noting that the true jobless rate among noncollege black men during
the 1990s was 42%, and 65% among black male dropouts). At the highest level, only thirteen African Americans have ever been chairperson or CEO of a Fortune 500 company. See
African American Chairmen & CEO’s of Fortune 500 Companies, BLACK PROFILES,
http://www.blackentrepreneurprofile.com/fortune-500-ceos/ (last updated Feb. 5, 2014).
3. In 2005, 2290 per 100,000 black people were incarcerated, compared to 412 white
people, a ratio of approximately 5.6. See George Coppolo & Kevin McCarthy, Crime Rate
and Conviction Rates Broken Down by Race, OLR RES. REP. (Jan. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0008.htm. African Americans make up 13% of the
general U.S. population and constitute: 28% of all arrests; 40% of all inmates held in prisons and jails; and 42% of the population on death row. See James E. Johnson et al.,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF L., RACIAL DISPARITIES IN FEDERAL
PROSECUTIONS 20 n.1 (2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
legacy/Justice/ProsecutorialDiscretion_report.pdf.
4. The U.S. Census Bureau reports that the 2011 median household income was
$55,412 for whites, $32,229 for blacks, and $38,624 for Hispanics. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT
ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2011 8-9 (2012). The percentages of those below the poverty line were
9.8% for non-Hispanic whites, 27.6% for blacks, and 25.3% for Hispanics. Id. at 14.
5. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967,
982-89 (2010) (providing statistical evidence of racial disparity in poverty, income and
wealth, homeownership, employment, education, and the criminal justice system).
6. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
7. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
8. See infra Part II.A.
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creasingly discomfited by claims of group-based discrimination. This
unease has variously been described as “pluralism anxiety,”9 an “antibalkanization” perspective,10 and “the strain of difference.”11 Some
of these scholars have in turn noted a shift in the Court’s jurisprudence; in Kenji Yoshino’s words, a shift from “group-based equality
claims under the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to individual liberty claims under the due process guarantees
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”12
The conversation about the future of equal protection and the
meaning of equality has never been more important. This Article
contends that the dialogue cannot be fully realized until we re-engage
with the paradigmatic application of equal protection principles to
race.13 It argues that racial justice advocates have engaged in a wholesale replacement of the equal protection framework over the last several decades, and that they have done so deliberately and with great
success. An understanding of the tools they used and the new racial
justice they have built is to the benefit of all who seek equality.
This Article identifies and explores three frontiers in the new racial justice: public defense, the school-to-prison pipeline, and immigration. Civil rights litigators have adapted to the Court’s restrictive
equal protection jurisprudence without ceding the battle for racial
equality in each of these areas, a fact made all the more remarkable
for the endemic disparate racial impact at the heart of these problems. Their approach to these issues serves to highlight the variety of
strategies at their disposal, many of which will be useful in other
contexts. To procure public defense reform, they have relied upon
other individual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, the Sixth
Amendment in particular. To fight the school-to-prison pipeline, they
have used a rich federal statutory landscape to their advantage. And
to challenge restrictive immigration bills, they have mustered structural arguments, such as federal preemption.
These claims have played a critical role in reducing the disparate
racial impact of poor public defense systems, the school-to-prison
pipeline, and punitive immigration laws—and they have done so by
providing a true alternative to the Equal Protection Clause in the
9. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 755 (2011).
10. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground
of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1357 (2011).
11. Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1531 (2002).
12. Yoshino, supra note 9, at 748.
13. Cf. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 781 (2002) (noting that “racial
minorities and women have much to gain from a theory of discrimination that focuses on
the harms of coerced assimilation” for lesbians and gay men).
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form of remedies that are structural, prospective, and class-based in
nature, not just individual and retrospective. Not only have these
claims proven more successful than traditional, explicitly race-based
claims, but they have not even been predicated upon racial inequality, much less inequity.14
Some scholars have questioned whether a race-neutral approach
to race-based problems is appropriate, criticizing it as a misguided
embrace of a “post-racial” society.15 This Article offers a response
grounded in realpolitik: litigators have not given up the fight for racial justice, but their pleadings now work around the doctrinal dead
end of explicitly race-based claims. Far from conceding the fight for
racial justice, these advocates have embraced a strategy that rewrites
the rules in their favor, resulting in real, measurable gains for equality.
Part II of this Article describes the death of the Equal Protection
Clause as a useful means of vindicating racial justice claims. It unpacks the commentary surrounding the cultural and doctrinal shifts
in the Court’s jurisprudence that have made equal protection claims
less appealing both to advocates and judges. It concludes that a return to the conversation about racial equality would enrich our understanding of equal protection for all groups and that this discussion
should begin with what advocates on the ground have been doing.
Part III of the Article identifies the primary ways in which civil
rights litigators have continued to make strides in combating racial
inequality without resorting to equal protection claims. It pairs areas
in which disproportionate racial impact is rampant with the most
meaningful alternatives to the Equal Protection Clause identified by
reformers thus far. In each area, it outlines the scope of the disparate
impact, the reform response, and the lessons each strategy has to
offer for others. This narrative provides the contours of the new racial justice, which has evolved to combat the racial inequalities of the
modern age.
II. THE DEATH OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE FOR CLAIMS
PREMISED ON RACIAL DISPARITY
The aftermath of Washington v. Davis, which all but foreclosed
claims of racial discrimination based upon a disparate impact theory,
has been amply documented.16 This Part will provide a brief overview

14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 239; Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty
Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253,
1327-40 (2011).
16. See infra Part II.A.

2014]

THE NEW RACIAL JUSTICE

839

of the doctrine as it stands today and summarize the academic commentary thus far as to the resultant state of civil rights work.
A. Disparate Impact After Davis
Any narrative of disparate impact claims must begin with Washington v. Davis17 and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.18 In Davis, the Court held that administration of a
test for authorities such as police officers did not violate equal protection despite the resultant exclusion of a disproportionate number of
African American applicants:
[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends
otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a
greater proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are
to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny . . . .19

The Court concluded that absent a showing of discriminatory intent—that the state action was taken because of its disproportionate
racial impact rather than in spite of it—disparate impact is insufficient as grounds for relief.20 It noted that there is no requirement that
“the necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on the face of the statute” and that such purpose could “often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it
is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another.”21
One term later in Arlington Heights, the Court explained that
plaintiffs must be able to offer “proof that a discriminatory purpose
has been a motivating factor in the decision” being challenged and
that absent a “stark” pattern of disparate impact, courts would have
to delve into factors such as the historical background of the decision,
the sequence of events leading to the decision, substantive and procedural departures from the normal operating procedure, and the
legislative and administrative history.22
Davis and Arlington Heights both dealt with state action in which
the state could plausibly contend the disparate impact was unfore17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

426 U.S. 229 (1976).
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 239.
Id. at 241-42.
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-67.

840

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:835

seeable, and thus in which evidence of discriminatory intent would
prove elusive. In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,23 the Court confronted state action that would inevitably and invariably lead to disparate impact, in the form of a veterans’ preference statute that “operates overwhelmingly to the advantage of
males.”24 The Court upheld the preference, noting that, “ ‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences.”25 Thus, although “it cannot seriously be
argued that the Legislature of Massachusetts could have been unaware that most veterans are men,” there was no equal protection
violation because there was no evidence of legislative intent to discriminate against women.26
The Court has evidenced somewhat more flexibility in its approach under two circumstances. First, the Court is more likely to
grant relief when the state action in question is more akin to state
inaction that perpetuates a pre-existing system of inequality. Thus,
where school districts pursue policies that result in continued school
segregation (as distinct from desegregation), the Court has indicated,
“actions having foreseeable and anticipated disparate impact are
relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose.”27
Similarly, where a county seeks to maintain an at-large electoral
system in a district that dilutes the black vote, the Court has found
that “discriminatory intent need not be proved by direct evidence.”28
Second, the Court may grant relief when “the statistical disparities . . . warrant and require a conclusion that [is] irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration
that the State acted with a discriminatory purpose.”29 To date, the
Court has only found statistical disparities that rose to this level
twice. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, every single white applicant for a permit to operate a laundry in a wooden building was granted one, and

23. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
24. Id. at 259.
25. Id. at 279.
26. Id. at 278.
27. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979).
28. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982); see also id. at 624 (noting district court
findings of past discrimination against African Americans, historical exclusion of African
Americans from the political process, and depressed socio-economic status of African Americans in the county).
29. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293-94 n.12 (1987) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 293 (noting that an exception to the general rule
that statistical evidence of disparate impact is insufficient may also exist in the “selection
of the jury venire in a particular district,” where a “stark pattern” of disparity may suffice
“as the sole proof of discriminatory intent” (quotation marks omitted)).
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not one of over two hundred Chinese applicants was granted one.30 In
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the state had altered the boundaries of a
city from a square to “an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure” that
excluded 395 of 400 black voters and not a single white voter.31 Both
of these cases pre-date Washington v. Davis; Yick Wo is more than a
century old.
The Court’s limited flexibility is thus of small comfort to plaintiffs
who wish to challenge new state action or those who cannot show the
stark statistical disparity the Court envisions. In the wake of the
Court’s jurisprudence, legislators have reacted predictably: they “do
not make a practice of justifying legislation on the grounds that it
will adversely affect groups that have historically been subject to
discrimination.”32 The Court has in turn acknowledged the difficulty
it has created, noting that “[p]roving the motivation behind official
action is often a problematic undertaking.”33
This combination of the Court’s jurisprudence and increased savviness on the part of state actors has proven nearly fatal for plaintiffs
seeking relief on the basis of racially disparate impact. The Court has
been unwilling to find discriminatory intent in claims as wideranging as those involving disparate application of the death penalty,34 juror selection,35 and a road closure that disproportionately affected African-American members of a community.36
B. Moving Beyond the Equal Protection Clause
This Article will not rehash the already familiar criticisms of the
Court’s various holdings in the area of disparate impact. Suffice it to
say that the shortcomings of a doctrine requiring proof of discriminatory intent are nearly self-evident.37 Nor will it delve into the myriad
30. 118 U.S. 356, 359 (1886).
31. 364 U.S. 339, 340-41 (1960).
32. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1135-36 (1997) (“[D]octrines of
heightened scrutiny have created incentives for legislators to explain their policy choices in
terms that cannot be so impugned.”).
33. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985).
34. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (rejecting equal protection claim based on racially
disparate application of the death penalty).
35. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 361 (1991) (deciding to remove
Spanish-speaking jurors on the grounds that they would not consider only the court interpreter’s version of testimony did not violate equal protection).
36. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 119 (1981).
37. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 32, at 1136 (“[T]he discriminatory purpose requirement now insulates many, if not most, forms of facially neutral state action from equal
protection challenge.”); see also Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J.
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criticisms of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence or suggestions for reform of the doctrine governing disparate impact.38
The dismay created by Davis and its progeny stems largely from
three observations about race in America, each of which is empirically verifiable: first, that African Americans are disproportionately
affected by laws that burden the poor or the socially disadvantaged,
because they are disproportionately poor and socially disadvantaged;39 second, that most of the racism that remains in America is of
the subconscious variety, as opposed to the explicit state-driven Jim
Crow variety;40 and third, that racial inequalities (in a purely numerCRIM. L. 7, 19 (2011) (“The Court has, as a practical matter, closed the door to claims of
racial bias in the criminal justice system. It has immunized the new caste system from
judicial scrutiny for racial bias, much as it once rallied to legitimate and protect slavery
and Jim Crow.”); Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal
Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1066 (2011) (“[T]he Court has largely ignored
the history of the moment that produced the Reconstruction Amendments and created a
framework for equal protection analysis that all but ensures only a narrow group of discrimination claims will be actionable or succeed.”); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court,
1976 Term–Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 51 (1977) (“A legislature oblivious to [the] existing stigma of caste will nonetheless
reinforce the stigma when it produces racially discriminatory effects through ostensibly
‘neutral’ legislation.”); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1987) (describing criticisms of Davis as falling into two categories, those who object to the motive requirement
and those who argue that racial inequality exists regardless of motive).
38. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 37, at 324 (proposing new “test to trigger judicial
recognition of race-based behavior”); see also Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”:
White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV.
953, 960 (1993) (proposing requirement that government justify all facially neutral decision
making criteria that have disparate effects); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers,
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 491 (2004) (proposing single standard of review for Equal Protection
claims); Karst, supra note 37, at 52 n.287 (proposing that government take into account
principle of equal citizenship and justify racially disproportionate results); Larry G. Simon,
Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban
Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1111 (1978) (arguing government should have to produce credible explanations when confronted with disparate impact); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
935, 956 (1989) (proposing rigorous application of intent requirement, as requiring government to act as if it does not know the race of those affected by the decision).
39. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 557 (1977).
40. There is a whole body of literature, both in legal commentary and in scientific
studies, that identifies and explores the phenomenon of unconscious racism. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 37, at 336-44 (discussing unconscious racism and citing studies); see also
IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER
DISCRIMINATION 19-44, 165-314 (2001) (gathering evidence of disparate treatment in the
retail sales of new cars, disparate impact in access to kidney transplantation, and the
setting of bail rates); Flagg, supra note 38, at 983-85 (gathering studies indicating unconscious racial bias in employment, mortgage lending, retail bargaining, psychiatric diagnoses, and other settings); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1161, 1161 (1995) (discussing unconscious bias in the context of Title VII). A number
of scholars have concluded that the Court’s disregard for this research has resulted in a
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ical sense of the word “inequality”) persist in America regardless of
why anyone thinks this may be the case.41 Much has been written
about whether these inequalities constitute inequity, that is, whether
they reflect structural or institutional racism, but that conversation
is beyond the scope of this Article.42
Neither does this Article engage with the question of what should
replace the current antidiscrimination framework.43 Some have answered this question in a purely normative way, with various proposals for the Court to modify or discard pieces of its equal protection
jurisprudence.44 Others have answered this question more descriptively, advocating a particular approach (such as a move to libertydoctrine “that does not reflect prevailing understandings of the ways in which racial or
gender bias operates.” Siegel, supra note 32, at 1138; cf. Richard Delgado, Centennial Reflections on the California Law Review’s Scholarship on Race: The Structure of Civil Rights
Thought, 100 CAL. L. REV. 431, 440-41 (2012) (noting the difference between the paradigm
of racial liberalism, which believes that racism is not dead and that discrimination can
take many forms, and that of racial conservatism). Much has also been made of the Implicit Association Test, which purports to identify and quantify implicit bias, or unconscious
racism. See PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/iatdetails.html (last
visited June 29, 2014). See, e.g., Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 827 (2012) (discussing unconscious
racism in context of jury selection); see also Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among
Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1235 (2007) (concluding that implicit bias in physicians influences treatment decisions); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit
Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 966 (2006) (concluding that “implicit race
bias is pervasive and is associated with discrimination against African Americans” that
results in disparate impact); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L.
Rev. 1124, 1126-27 (2012) (applying science of implicit bias to the courtroom). The premise
of this Article does not depend upon the existence or extent of unconscious racism; it merely depends upon the existence and extent of racial inequality.
41. See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.1 & III.C.1.
42. See William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America Today: An
Introduction, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 13 (2012) (“Because of its invisibility, structural racism does
its work in the Potemkin village of ‘race-neutral’ policies.”); cf. KWAME TURE & CHARLES V.
HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 4 (Vintage Books
1992) (1967) (“Racism is both overt and covert.”); Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism:
Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723
(2000) (building “a theory of racism that explains organizational activity that systematically harms minority groups even though the decision-making individuals lack any conscious
discriminatory intent”).
43. See Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 1084-85 (arguing Washington v.
Davis should be overturned).
44. See id. at 1075; see also John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and
the Anti-Discrimination Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of
Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 427 (2002) (examining the Equal Protection
Clause and Civil Rights Act of 1964 through the lens of morality); Charles R. Lawrence III,
Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and Community (A Continuing Conversation
with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 YALE L.J. 1353, 1382 (2005) (arguing that
the Equal Protection Clause reflects a commitment to a “new substantive value of ‘nonslavery’ and antisubordination to replace the old values of slavery and white supremacy”).

844

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:835

based claims) and supporting that position with the legal strategies
adopted in some cases.45
This Article’s contention is that reformers on the ground have already replaced the current antidiscrimination framework. They have
done so deliberately and steadily over the last several decades, and
they have done so with great success. It contends, moreover, that this
success is attributable to the fact that reformers no longer overtly
identify or describe their work as being explicitly concerned with antidiscrimination, or at least not in their legal pleadings. Reformers
have absorbed both the Court’s and the culture’s discomfort with explicitly race-based claims and have turned instead to combating racial
inequality using a different framework and vocabulary altogether.46
1. The Interplay of Liberty and Equality-Based Claims
The complementary nature of liberty and equality-based claims
has long been noted.47 Using Lawrence v. Texas as a focal point, Lawrence Tribe described the relationship between these two families of
claims with customary aplomb: he speaks of “a narrative in which
due process and equal protection, far from having separate missions
and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal
double helix. It is a single, unfolding tale of equal liberty and increasingly universal dignity.”48 Lawrence, in Tribe’s view, is a case that
“presupposed and advanced an explicitly equality-based and relationally situated theory of substantive liberty.”49
This Part identifies three overlapping strands in the recent scholarship on liberty- and equality-based claims. The first focuses on a
45. See infra Part II.B.1.
46. In one of the few empirical studies conducted on disparate impact racial discrimination claims, Theodore Eisenberg and Sheri Lynn Johnson express surprise at how
few such claims are filed. They state: “The Supreme Court’s standard takes its toll not
through an unusually high loss rate for those plaintiffs reaching trial or appeal, but by
deterring victims from even filing claims.” Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The
Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1153
(1991). Although this Article focuses largely upon systemic reform cases rather than individual claims, its contention is that rather than being deterred from filing claims at all,
victims of this type of racial discrimination have simply found alternatives to the Equal
Protection Clause.
47. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal
Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1183 (2000) (“The Due Process Clause secures libertarian protections at the retail (individual) level that are important when the group is socially
despised, while the Equal Protection Clause potentially offers minorities wholesale (group)
level protection when (or if) the Court recognizes their legitimacy as partners in American
pluralist democracy.”).
48. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004).
49. Id.
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perceived shift in the Court’s jurisprudence driven by a desire to
avoid inter-group conflict in an increasingly diverse society. The second describes and advocates in favor of one type of claim as opposed
to the other. And the third, “realist” position, takes the position that
courts and reformers should simply use whichever claim fits best.
In the first group are Reva Siegel, Kenji Yoshino, and Rebecca
Brown. Each of these scholars provides a psychological profile of sorts
on the Court. Siegel identifies an antibalkanization perspective on
the Court, which is concerned about threats to social cohesion.50 She
contends that moderates on the Court who hold this perspective are
willing to:
allow government to engage in race-conscious efforts to integrate,
providing that government proceeds in ways that lower the salience of race in its interactions with the public. Antibalkanization . . . is distinctively concerned about the appearance of raceconscious interventions – the risk that race-conscious civil rights
interventions will heighten conflict or resentment.51

Where Siegel refers to an antibalkanization perspective, primarily
in the context of race-based decision making, Yoshino identifies “pluralism anxiety” as being responsible for a larger shift in the Court’s
jurisprudence “away from traditional group-based identity politics in
its equal protection and free exercise jurisprudence.”52 He explores a
more general narrative in which equality-based claims writ large (as
opposed to liberty-based claims) make the Court nervous, because
they force the Court to pick favorites among groups; “[l]iberty claims,
in contrast, emphasize what all Americans . . . have in common.”53
Brown also alludes to the problem of “representation of an increasingly heterogeneous population for which there can be no serious
contention that the interest of some is necessarily the interest of
all.”54 Instead of an antibalkanization perspective or pluralism anxiety, Brown discusses “the strain of difference:”
[T]he shared sense of values does not exist for everything that all
people value. Nor does it exist for the increasing, yet still small,
number who may wish to enjoy common freedoms, but in ways

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Siegel, supra note 10, at 1278.
Id. at 1357.
Yoshino, supra note 9, at 755.
Id. at 796.
Brown, supra note 11, at 1528.
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that can be understood as distinguishable from the manner in
which the many enjoy them.55

Yoshino and Brown both also participate in the second strand of
the conversation, describing and advocating a shift towards libertybased claims. Yoshino observes that the Court has restricted equality-based claims but opened another avenue for relief, using “liberty
analysis to mitigate its curtailment of group-based equality analysis.”56 Brown also urges a new look at liberty claims, but her analysis
is grounded in an understanding of equality as having already been
largely attained: “As equality was to the last century, so should liberty be to the next. Equality jurisprudence, after all, has achieved the
stunning accomplishment of reconciling a robust judicial enforcement
with the demands of democratic constitutional theory.”57 As Brown
and others58 tell the story, equality claims have largely succeeded
while liberty claims have foundered.59
Others, such as William Eskridge, would respond that equalitybased claims fill a role that liberty-based claims cannot, because they
can provide relief for an entire group at a time:
[R]egular equal protection and due process scrutiny might be either interchangeable or interdependent at the retail level, that is,
in challenges to particular discriminations, especially penaltybased ones. But the Equal Protection Clause alone offers a minority group a potential constitutional jackpot at the wholesale level,
that is, in challenges to an array of interconnected discriminations
in state benefits as well as burdens. 60

Finally, some scholars take the approach closest to the hearts of
litigation-minded reformers: the best type of claim is that which fits
your agenda. Richard Delgado, for example, states:
[A]ttention to human needs, problems, deprivation, and flourishing
may proceed under one of two banners, individual rights or equal
55. Id. at 1531; see also Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local
Anti-“Alien” Laws and Unity-Rebuilding Frames for Antidiscrimination Values, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 905, 908-09 (2011) (“Equality norms can be framed and vindicated in a
more palatable, legally tenable form, and tied to other interests to appeal more widely and
ameliorate estrangement in a polarized polity.”).
56. Yoshino, supra note 9, at 776.
57. Brown, supra note 11, at 1492.
58. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Why Liberty Judicial Review Is as Legitimate as Equality
Review: The Case of Gay Rights Jurisprudence, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3-4 (2011) (identifying the roots of the liberty/equality binary as a “legitimacy disparity” between the two,
wherein judicial review founded on equality principles is lauded, as in the case of Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), but review founded on liberty principles is suspect, as in the case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
59. Brown, supra note 11, at 1494.
60. Eskridge, supra note 47, at 1216.
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protection. Both approaches aim at the same goal, both result in
heightened judicial scrutiny, and the choice to proceed under one
banner or the other is largely a matter of tactics, ideological commitment, or perceived public sentiment.61

Each of these scholars has contributed invaluable and groundbreaking insight on the dynamic interplay between liberty and equality claims, and each offers a unique and valuable perspective on recent developments in that dynamic. Siegel provides a pinpoint identification of the problem that reformers concerned with racial equality
confront, not just before the Supreme Court, but also in lower courts
and in the court of public opinion: race continues to matter, but state
actors (like school administrators) must pretend it does not. Yoshino
and Brown provide a compelling description of the shift in the Court’s
jurisprudence away from equality-based claims. Delgado’s work resonates with reformers on the ground who will gladly adopt any claim
that serves their purposes. And Eskridge offers us a powerful reminder that structural problems demand structural solutions—
solutions that are wholesale, not retail.
To this important body of literature, this Article offers several
insights. First, critical work remains to be done, even when it comes
to the most basic of equalities. Second, there is a rich world beyond
the binary of liberty- and equality-based claims to help tackle that
work. And third, reformers on the ground are already making use of
a multitude of strategies to address racial disparity.
2. Moving Beyond Liberty/Equality to Achieve Equal Protection
This Article urges a return to the conversation about claims for
racial equality, which remain salient in the national discourse but
often are no longer identified as such by their proponents. The inclination to move beyond race is visible on several fronts: in society, in
the Court’s decisions, and within the academy. Thus, the debate over
affirmative action is at once avoidant of race and yet indelibly
stamped by it, taking place against the backdrop of a Court and society that increasingly seems to believe—rightly or wrongly—that
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”62 Most contemporary academic

61. Delgado, supra note 40, at 450.
62. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007); c.f. Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 1064 (“Substantive racial equality
clearly mattered to the Court once.”).
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commentary on equal protection has, in turn, moved away from race
and towards gay rights and same-sex marriage in particular.63
This Article contends that the discussion about equal protection is
a richer one when informed by the traditional, racial underpinnings
of the Equal Protection Clause. We must be careful, both as a society
and an academy, not to be too quick to leave race behind. From a
purely empirical perspective, race indisputably still matters.64 But
even more importantly, the scope of protection afforded under the
Equal Protection Clause should matter not just to the old groups already under its ambit, but also to new groups seeking to join. Membership in the club might be less valuable if the benefits are not as
extensive as one had assumed.
A return to the academic and social conversation about racial
equality is not the same as a return to explicitly race-based claims in
litigation; indeed, the primary descriptive insight this Article contributes is that such claims are largely doomed to fail.65 But this refusal to revisit a doctrinal dead-end from a litigation standpoint is
not an endorsement of a “post-racial” society.66 Kimberlé Williams
63. See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, Marriage This Term: On Liberty and the “New Equal
Protection”, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 2, 6 (2012) (arguing the LGB movement should
continue to root its claims in equality, as opposed to liberty); Yoshino, supra note 9, at 778
(centering his claim that equality-based claims are giving way to liberty-based claims by
citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003)). Not coincidentally, gay marriage is on
the Court’s mind as well. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking
down the Defense of Marriage Act); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)
(holding proponents of California’s Proposition 8 did not have standing to appeal district
court’s order finding the proposition unconstitutional).
64. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. Racial inequality is unlikely to
disappear anytime soon, and the sordid history of race in America will likely continue to
manifest itself in differentiation between legislation with racial impact and legislation with
impact on minorities of other types. See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism
in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1303 (1982) (“In contrast to the deep
societal roots of governmental action against Blacks—the close fit between private terror,
public discrimination, and political exclusion, directed against Blacks for a century—action
against other minorities has usually been sporadic, transitory, and local.”); see also id. at
1308 (“[T]he apparently neutral structural characteristics of the Constitution had never
been neutral concerning race.”). Further, although the Court’s holdings have adversely
affected the ability of other groups to bring disparate impact claims, such as those based
upon gender inequalities, nowhere has the effect been greater than on claims involving
racial disparity.
65. Cf. Barnes et al., supra note 5, at 1000 (urging a change in “the way in which
equality advocates frame the discussion” to “shift the underlying premise of equality arguments from a compensatory to a distributive justice rationale”); Fan, supra note 55, at 909
(arguing that “alternate approaches [to equality-based claims] must enfold antidiscrimination concerns and norms into the analysis rather than altogether elide address of the concerns”). This Article contends that successful reformers have avoided this strategy because
it would defeat the purpose. They have, in other words, already reframed the discussion,
and the new frame has nothing whatsoever to do with racial equality.
66. Cf. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1313-46 (describing and critiquing the phenomenon of post-racialism).
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Crenshaw offers a powerful critique of the strategies described herein
in a variation of the adage: “The master’s tools will never dismantle
the master’s house.”67 Crenshaw criticizes not just the concept of
post-racialism, the idea that race no longer matters in our society,
but also the “post-racial pragmatism . . . that urges scaling racial
obstacles while declining to name them.”68 She argues that such
pragmatism entraps racial justice advocates and constituencies; silences racial justice advocacy; threatens to make the racial disparities described in this Article “unremarkable features of the postracial world;” and renders civil rights advocates “yesterday’s news—
irrelevant, delusional and unsophisticated.”69
In a similar vein, Michelle Alexander thoroughly documents the
racial disparity in America’s mass incarceration, which she describes
as “the New Jim Crow.”70 Alexander criticizes the reform response to
this phenomenon on several fronts: for being insufficient in scale and
scope; focusing overly on litigation instead of grassroots reform; and
considering race-neutral grounds for reform.71 Specifically, Alexander
argues, “The prevailing caste system cannot be successfully dismantled with a purely race-neutral approach.”72 She notes that “opportunities for challenging mass incarceration on purely race-neutral
grounds have never been greater,” but urges racial justice advocates
not to take the “tempting bait.”73
This Article’s response to these powerful and persuasive criticisms
is grounded more in realpolitik than ideology. While Alexander is
undoubtedly correct that racial inequality will not be eradicated with
any single lawsuit or legal strategy, litigation will continue to play an
important role and litigators must take notice of doctrinal reality.
Rather than cede the notion of the “reigned in” and narrowed “field of
contestation” that Crenshaw depicts, reformers have broadened the
legal grounds on which to fight.74 They would surely agree that “there
67. AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 112 (rev. ed. 2007).
68. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1332.
69. Id. at 1327-1340. Reformers may find themselves stuck between a rock and a hard
place in the academic commentary. Richard Thompson Ford criticizes those who perhaps
belong to an older school for which Crenshaw may feel nostalgia. See RICHARD THOMPSON
FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 24-25, 27
(2011) (“Civil rights have effectively ‘occupied the field’ of social justice, crowding out alternative ways of thinking and new solutions. . . . The civil rights tradition encourages us to
look at disputes through a lens that is designed to focus on discrimination.”).
70. ALEXANDER, supra note 2.
71. Id. at 225-39.
72. Id. at 239.
73. Id.
74. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1343.

850

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:835

are limits to the degree that racial justice can be finessed,”75 but the
fight for racial justice is not over, and the advocates who continue to
wage the fight are far from irrelevant, delusional, or unsophisticated
in their tactics. For example, they are engaged in active battles over
the school-to-prison pipeline and the disproportionate impact of the
mortgage foreclosure crisis—two of the areas of racial disparity
Crenshaw worries will become “unremarkable features of the postracial world.”76
Civil rights advocates do not have the luxury of ignoring equal
protection doctrine post-Washington v. Davis, which has essentially
reified the concept of post-racialism in the courtroom; but neither
have they walked away from the challenge.77
III. THE NEW RACIAL JUSTICE
This Part begins the descriptive project of identifying and analyzing the ways in which reformers have begun to combat racial inequality without resort to the Equal Protection Clause.78 I have identified
three main areas in which they have done so, each of which serves to
illuminate two larger groups of claims, one having to do with the nature of the right being vindicated and the other having to do with the
nature of the disproportionate impact. The claims range from those
rooted in the specific enumerations of the Bill of Rights to those that
stem from the federalist structure of our legal system. The nature of
the disproportionate impact addressed by these claims is similarly
wide-ranging, from that which is caused with no explicit racial ani75. Id. at 1346.
76. Id. at 1337-40.
77. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The civil rights movement has a long history of pragmatism,
dating back to Plessy v. Ferguson, which was brought as a test case by reformers who presented the Court with a plaintiff who was seven-eighths white. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896); see also, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (bringing gender discrimination claim on behalf of men); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
681-82 (1973) (same).
78. Others have written about circumventing the intent requirement to vindicate
racial inequality, most notably in the area of environmental law. See, e.g., Julie H. Hurwitz
& E. Quita Sullivan, Using Civil Rights Laws to Challenge Environmental Racism: From
Bean to Guardians to Chester to Sandoval, 2 J.L. SOC’Y 5, 9-10 (2001); Suzanne Smith,
Current Treatment of Environmental Justice Claims: Plaintiffs Face a Dead End in the
Courtroom, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 223, 249-50 (2002) (discussing administrative proceedings and private rights of action under section 602 of Title VI as possible alternatives to
using the Equal Protection Clause to seek redress); Sandra L. Geiger, An Alternative Legal
Tool for Pursuing Environmental Justice: The Takings Clause, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 201, 204 (1998); see also, e.g., Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights Remedies for Battered
Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 LAW & INEQ. 1, 4 (1992) (discussing statutory alternative
to equal protection challenges on behalf of battered women); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution
and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 18 (1998) (discussing equal protection challenges to racially biased decisions to prosecute).
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mus, to that which nears explicit racial bias, but falls short of the
Supreme Court’s definition of discriminatory intent.
The first group of claims in Part III.A, indigent defense reform,
represents not only those claims that implicate other explicitly enumerated constitutional rights, such as ones involving the criminal
justice system and criminal procedure, but also claims in which any
other enumerated constitutional right (other than equal protection) is
at stake. These cases also serve to inform a discussion of disproportionate impact that stems purely from the economics of poverty, with
no evidence of explicit animus.
The second constellation of claims in Part III.B, having to do with
efforts to redress the school-to-prison pipeline, stand in for claims
implicating statutory as opposed to constitutional rights, and claims
in which the source of the disproportionate impact is perhaps less
clear. These are claims for which the Equal Protection Clause might
have held some promise in the absence of a discriminatory intent
requirement, that is, where there is ample statistical evidence of racial disparity in treatment and perhaps some evidence of intent, but
not enough to meet the requirements laid out in Arlington Heights.
Finally, Part III.C turns to immigration-related claims, challenges
to state and local regulations directed at undocumented workers, or
so-called “illegal immigrants.” This group of claims represents structural interests beyond enumerated individual rights, such as the
separation of powers. This group of claims also involves disproportionate impact in which racial animus likely plays a role but falls
short of the explicit discriminatory intent the Court demands.
A. Indigent Defense Reform, Other Constitutional Rights, and Purely
Disproportionate Impact
The problems that plague the state public-defense systems in this
country are not new; much has been written to catalog them and this
Article will take them as a given.79 This Part uses public defense reform as a lens through which to view a particular type of racial justice claim: those that implicate criminal procedure, or more broadly,
79. See, e.g., NORMAN LEFSTEIN, ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE
12-24 (2011), available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/books/ls_scl
aid_def_securing_reasonable_caseloads_supplement.pdf; NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM.,
JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
COUNSEL 49-101 (2009), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf; Emily
Chiang, Indigent Defense Invigorated: A Uniform Standard for Adjudicating PreConviction Sixth Amendment Claims, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443, 447-50 &
nn.20-39 (2010).
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those for which a constitutional guarantee other than equal protection applies. This analysis is also intended to shed light on the fight
against other similar problems that attend our criminal justice system as a whole.
1. The Disparate Impact
Although problems with state public defense systems do not solely
affect people of color—and in some jurisdictions may not even primarily affect people of color—the effects of poorly functioning systems across the U.S. are disproportionately borne by people of
color. First, problems with public defense systems are by definition
borne by the poor, and greater percentages of African Americans
and Hispanics live below the poverty line than do whites.80 Second,
all aspects of the criminal justice system disproportionately affect
people of color and African-American men in particular.81 Finally,
statistical evidence indicates that a higher percentage of incarcerated
African Americans and Hispanics had publicly appointed counsel
than whites.82
This Part will assume that there is generally no evidence of racial
animus in state and local government decisions to underfund or
otherwise neglect their public defense systems, and certainly no
evidence of discriminatory intent that rises to the level required
by Arlington Heights. In other words, traditional equal protection
80. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 4, at 8-9. In 2011, the percentages of those
below the poverty line were 9.8% for non-Hispanic whites, 27.6% for blacks, and 25.3% for
Hispanics. Id. at 14.
81. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272-73 (2004) (discussing the “community-level harms” that flow from “grossly disproportionate” rates of incarceration of
African-American men); Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of Drug
and Crime Control Policies on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JUST. 1, 7 (2008) (surveying
the empirical literature on the disproportionate burdens facing people of color in arrests,
conviction, and sentencing, concluding that “political and ideological exigencies of the last
quarter century have conduced to the adoption of crime control policies of unprecedented
severity, the primary burdens of which have been borne by disadvantaged blacks (and,
increasingly, Hispanics)”); Katherine J. Rosich, Race, Ethnicity, and the Criminal Justice
System, AM. SOC. ASS’N 2-3 (Sept. 2007), http://www.asanet.org/images/press/docs/pdf/
ASARaceCrime.pdf (surveying social science research on race and crime and identifying
numerous areas of racial disparity); see also Alexander, supra note 37, at 18-19 (“Law
enforcement officials are largely free to discriminate on the basis of race today, so long as
no one admits it. That’s the key.”).
82. “While 69% of white state prison inmates reported they had lawyers appointed by
the court, 77% of blacks and 73% of Hispanics had publicly financed attorneys. In federal
prison black inmates were more likely than whites and Hispanics to have public counsel:
65% for blacks, 57% for whites and 56% for Hispanics.” Indigent Defense Systems, BUREAU
OF JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=28#defendants (last visited
June 29, 2014); see also CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DEFENSE COUNSEL
IN CRIMINAL CASES 9 (2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf.
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claims to challenge this particular type of state action (or inaction)
are foreclosed.
2. The Reform Response
Despite the lack of availability of traditional equal protection
claims, indigent defense reform has been a veritable hotbed of
litigation and other activity over the last decade, and a number of the
lawsuits have been filed by organizations explicitly dedicated to racial justice.83 For many, the connection between the pursuit of indigent defense reform and racial justice is explicit: “[T]he dispropor83. See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 784 N.W.2d 51, 53 (Mich. 2010), vacated, 790 N.W.2d
695 (2010) (alleging indigent criminal defendants are being denied their right to counsel
and “effective assistance of counsel,” filed by the ACLU’s Racial Justice Project); White v.
Martz, No. CDV-2002-133, 2006 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 136, at *1 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Jan. 25,
2006) (alleging public defender programs in Montana counties lack the resources to provide
statutorily and constitutionally adequate representation of indigent clients, filed by the
ACLU’s Racial Justice Project); Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 232 (N.Y. 2010)
(alleging a claim for ineffective counsel of indigent criminal defendants, filed by the New
York Civil Liberties Union); Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Richmond v. Dist. Court of Md., No. 24-C-06-009911
CN, 2007 WL 5446238 (Cir. Crt. Md. Dec. 7, 2007); see also SARAH GERAGHTY & MIRIAM
GOHARA, ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI’S INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 6-8 (2003),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/download
s/sclaid/indigentdefense/ms_assemblylinejustice.authcheckdam.pdf. The Brennan Center
for Justice at NYU School of Law has also identified indigent defense reform as a focus
within the area of “racial justice.” Racial Justice, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/section/category/racial_justice/ (last visited June 29,
2014); see also Brief for Brennan Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, DeWolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d 1019 (Md. 2013) (No. 24-C-06-009911 CN), 2011 WL 4585691;
Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, DeWolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d 1019 (Md. 2013) (No. 24-C-06-009911 CN),
2011 WL 4585691; Brief for Brennan Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees,
Duncan v. State, 784 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 2010) (No. 07-242-CZ), 2011 WL 4585691; Brief for
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Duncan v. State, 784 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 2010) (No. 07-242-CZ), 2011 WL 4585691;
Brief of Former Prosecutors Michael A. Battle et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010) (No. 2010-0066), 2010 WL
1775135. In a 2008 report, the Brennan Center discussed guidelines to determine eligibility for publicly appointed counsel. DAVID UDELL ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., ELIGIBLE
FOR JUSTICE: GUIDELINES FOR APPOINTING DEFENSE COUNSEL 5-26 (2008), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Eligibility.Report.pdf; see
also THOMAS GIOVANNI & ROOPAL PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., GIDEON AT 50: THREE
REFORMS TO REVIVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 8-9 (2013), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Gideon_Report_040913.pdf. The
Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race & Justice at Harvard Law School has a project entitled “MyGideon,” designed to provide resources to indigent and capital defense
attorneys. MyGideon, THE CHARLES HAMILTON HOUS. INST. FOR RACE & JUST., HARV. L.
SCH. (July 26, 2012), http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/portfolio/my-gideon/; see also
Catherine V. Beane, Indigent Defense: Separate and Unequal, CHAMPION, May 2004, at 54,
55 (“NACDL’s Indigent Defense Committee welcomes your suggestions on ways that we
can better address racial justice issues and the disproportionate impact that inadequate
indigent defense has on communities of color.”).
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tionate presence of racial minorities among the indigents relying
on public defender services reinforces the need to ensure that all defendants receive competent representation, else the criminal justice
system will create further disparities in treatment of persons of
different races.”84
And yet no mention of racial justice is made in the reform work
itself; the legal documents filed rely almost exclusively upon the
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment. This Part will focus upon
some of the most recent developments in this area and highlight the
successes reformers have had in a variety of cases with different
procedural postures.85
First, advocates have continued to file classic class action suits
that seek wholesale reform at the state or county level. Litigation
of this type builds upon successes like the statewide public defense
system implemented by Montana in response to an ACLU lawsuit.86
These claims typically request injunctive and declaratory relief on
behalf of a class of indigent criminal defendants, alleging that the
public defense systems in question are inadequately resourced
and supervised.87
Litigation seeking state-wide reform was most recently successful
in Michigan, where a suit filed by the ACLU in 2006 resulted in passage of a bill that created a public defense commission tasked with
collecting data and implementing standards.88 Similar litigation is
84. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 93 (1995).
85. The increase in litigation and other reform activity in this area has been so vast
that this Article will not even attempt a comprehensive review. There have been a number
of non-litigation successes as well, however, and they too have not resorted to explicit
claims of racial injustice. See, e.g., Order, In the Matter of the Review of Issues Concerning
Representation of Indigent Defendants in Criminal and Juvenile Delinquency Cases (Nev.
2008) (ADKT No. 411) (implementing comprehensive performance standards); H.R. 483,
51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013) (creating independent public defense commission in New
Mexico); H.R. 147, 62d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2013) (establishing presumptive indigency guidelines in Idaho); H.R. 148, 62d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2013) (prohibiting attorneys from serving as both lawyer and guardian ad litem for children); H.R. 149, 62d Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2013) (preventing juveniles from making uninformed waivers of counsel); Texas Fair Defense Act, S.B. 7, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001), 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws
1800-01 (codified as amended at TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051 (West 2004))
(providing for state funding, requiring minimum standards in counties, guaranteeing
access to necessary and sufficient support services for attorneys, and creating centralized
data collection system in Texas).
86. White, 2006 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 136, at *5.
87. Amended Complaint at 5, White v. Martz, No. CDV-2002-133, 2006 Mont. Dist.
LEXIS 136 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2002).
88. Michigan Indigent Defense Commission Act, Act No. 93, 2013 Mich. Pub. Acts 53.
The author worked on this litigation while at the Brennan Center for Justice, and subsequently at the ACLU.
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still pending in New York.89 Advocates filed suit in Georgia90 and entered into a consent decree that revised the procedures for responding to requests for conflict-free appellate counsel, provided for additional full-time staff attorneys and workload controls for the appellate division of the public defender office, monitoring of contract attorneys working for the appellate division, and data collection.91
County or municipality-based lawsuits are pending in Washington,92
Texas,93 Georgia,94 and Pennsylvania.95 Not one of these lawsuits includes a federal equal protection claim.
Second, some public defenders have successfully brought suits
themselves, seeking to limit their own caseloads. These cases have a
more mixed record than the prototypical class actions described
above and some have yet to play out fully, but they remain a type of
claim tethered to the Sixth Amendment that reformers may consider.96 The Florida Supreme Court recently found in favor of the MiamiDade County Public Defender’s Office’s right to move to decline appointment in future cases due to excessive caseloads.97 Similarly, a
suit filed by the Public Defender of Mojave County, Arizona, resulted
in a ruling that permitted the office to withdraw from thirty-nine
cases, and warned the county that future motions to withdraw would
also be granted “until the court is convinced that the reasons for do-

89. Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 914 N.Y.S.2d 367, 372 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 6 2011)
(reversing lower court’s denial of class certification and granting class certification).
90. Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Flournoy v. Georgia, No. 2009CV178947 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 2009), 2009
WL 8728189 (seeking relief on behalf of class represented by state public defenders office’s
appellate division).
91. Consent Decree, Flournoy v. Georgia, No. 2009CV178947 (Ga. Super. Ct. Mar. 12,
2012), 2012 WL 5885196.
92. Order Denying Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 4, 2013), 2012 WL 600727; see also Best v. Grant Cty., No. 04-2- 00189-0 (Super. Ct. Wash. Aug. 26, 2004) .
93. Heckman v. Williamson Cty., No. 10-0671, slip op. at 2-3 (Tex. June 8, 2012)
(seeking relief on behalf of class facing misdemeanor charges).
94. Verified Complaint at 4, 14, Cantwell v. Crawford, No. 09EV275M (Ga. Super. Ct.
Apr. 7, 2009), 2009 WL 1043789 (seeking relief on behalf of class charged with felony offenses in five counties in Georgia).
95. Class Action Complaint, Flora v. Luzerne Cty., No. 2072 CD 2013 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. Apr. 10, 2012).
96. For a general discussion of this type of litigation and for specific information about
these cases, see LEFSTEIN, supra note 79, at 161-90.
97. Pub. Defender, Eleventh Jud. Cir. of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 274 (Fla.
2013) (noting the court is “reaffirm[ing] that aggregate/systemic motions to withdraw are
appropriate in circumstances where there is an office-wide or wide-spread problem as to
effective representation”).
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ing so no longer exist.”98 But relief was denied to defenders seeking
relief in New Orleans99 and Knoxville.100 And although the Missouri
Public Defender Commission fought successfully for the right to limit
the caseloads of its attorneys,101 a bill introduced in the 2013 legislative session sought to resolve the caseload problem by privatizing
services for all non-serious felony cases through low-bid contracts.102
Claims brought by public defenders based explicitly upon a disparate impact theory under the Equal Protection Clause have not
met with success at all, however. In Idaho, for example, contract attorneys filed suit against a county for breach of contract when the
county sought to terminate their contract. The attorneys included an
equal protection claim, alleging that the county’s attempts to jettison
its contract with them in favor of a low-bid contract would have a
disproportionate impact on Idaho’s racial minorities because 20% of
Idaho’s racial minorities and 25% of Idaho’s total Hispanic population
reside in the county in question.103 Their claim was denied.104
Finally, advocates of improved public defense services have had
notable success before the Supreme Court. The Court has continually
expanded entitlement to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, requiring in recent years, for example, the appointment of counsel at
pretrial interrogations105 and in misdemeanor cases where there is a
substantial likelihood of incarceration.106 The Court has also recently
held that failure to communicate a plea offer to a defendant constitutes deficient performance by counsel under the Sixth Amendment
and that defendants may be prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance in recommending that a plea offer be rejected.107 Although
none of these cases are systemic reform cases (each is a claim for
post-conviction relief on behalf of a particular defendant); the last
two cases, Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, are not public defense cases at all. Each will have a salutary effect on racial justice, as
98. Arizona v. Lopez, No. CR-2007-1544, slip op. at 9-10 (Mohave Cnty. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 17, 2007).
99. Loisiana v. Edwards, No. 2007-K-639 (La. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2007).
100. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re Pet. of Knox Cnty. Pub. Defender, No.
174552-C (Tenn. Knox Cnty. Ch. Ct. Mar. 9, 2009).
101. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 887 (2009).
102. H.B. 215, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013).
103. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at *4, Wiebe & Fouser, P.A. v.
Idaho, No. CV09-4413-C, 2009 WL 3072841 (Dist. Ct. Apr. 24, 2009).
104. Wiebe & Fouser, P.A. v. Idaho, No. CV-2009-4413-C, 2009 WL 2980444, at *1
(Dist. Ct. July 31, 2009).
105. Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 590 (2009).
106. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002).
107. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,
1408 (2012).
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reflected by a number of the amicus briefs submitted by various public interest organizations.108 Again, however, nowhere is the Equal
Protection Clause mentioned in the actual legal claims.
3. Beyond Public Defense Reform—Lessons for Other Claims
Each of the success stories in public defense reform has made a
real difference for the millions of people of color caught up in the
criminal justice system, with nary a mention of racial justice or equal
protection. Of the claims described in this Article, these are perhaps
closest in temperament to the “liberty-based” claims Yoshino describes and prescribes, as they seek to vindicate a right (to counsel)
functionally denied to some by relying on the universality of the
right’s guarantee to all.
The Bill of Rights has held great promise for other areas in which
notable racial disparity exists. For example, capital defense reform, a
close cousin of public defense reform, has also benefited enormously
from the tactics described above.109 The disparate racial impact of the
death penalty is clear. The current death row population is 41% black
and 43% white.110 Of the defendants executed in the United States
since 1976, 35% were black and 56% were white.111 And infamously,
the racial disparity when it comes to victims of crimes for which the
death penalty was inflicted is even starker: 15% of the victims were
black, compared to 77% who were white.112
Despite the racial disparity, perhaps nowhere are claims based on
disparate impact under the Equal Protection Clause more plainly
foreclosed. The Supreme Court dealt explicitly with the issue in
108. See, e.g., Brief for the Constitution Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 19, Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (No. 10-209), Missouri v. Frye,
132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (No. 10-444) (arguing the following as its second ground on appeal:
“Because Indigent Defendants Plead Guilty At An Even Higher Rate Than Others, Petitioners’ Proposed Standard For Prejudice Would Deprive Most Indigent Defendants Of Full
Protection Under The Sixth Amendment”); Brief of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.
Ct. 1376 (2012) (No. 10-209), Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (No. 10-444).
109. Capital defense reform is understood to encompass an array of projects, including
the following: elimination of the death penalty, whether wholesale or piecemeal;
improvements in legal representation for those facing the death penalty, including the
implementation of standards governing who may represent those facing capital charges;
and direct representation.
110. Race of Death Row Inmates Executed Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-inmates-executed-1976#defend (last visited June 29, 2014).
111. Id.
112. See id. Similarly, 19 white defendants were executed for murdering one or more
black victims, while 257 black defendants were executed for murdering one or more
white victims. Id.
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McCleskey v. Kemp, finding that statistical evidence that the death
penalty was imposed far more frequently on black defendants who
killed white victims than on white defendants who killed black victims, even after for controlling for a number of other factors, was
insufficient to demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.113 The Court held that in order for McCleskey to prevail on
his claim, he “would have to prove that the Georgia Legislature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect.”114 Such evidence, of course,
would be virtually impossible to come by.115
McCleskey also raised an Eighth Amendment issue. But in contrast to the use of rights other than those associated with equal protection that this Article advocates, his claim was doomed because it
was premised on the same racial disparity he sought to address with
the equal protection claim: he argued that the statistical evidence of
racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty made the
death penalty “cruel and unusual” as applied to him.116 The successful strategies this Article explores are based instead on assertions of
rights wholly independent of racial disparity challenges.
Death penalty abolitionists and racial justice advocates have succeeded in continually chipping away at the death penalty—and its
attendant racial disparities—through the Eighth Amendment. In
Atkins v. Virginia,117 the Court agreed that imposing the death penalty upon the intellectually disabled constitutes “cruel and unusual
punishment” for Eighth Amendment purposes.118 The Court premised
its holding on “the relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders,
and the relationship between mental retardation and the penological
purposes served by the death penalty” and noted also that “some
characteristics of mental retardation undermine the strength of the
procedural protections that our capital jurisprudence steadfastly
guards.”119 According to the Death Penalty Information Center, the
United States executed forty-four defendants with intellectual disa-

113. 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987).
114. Id. at 298.
115. Cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996) (denying request for
discovery in selective prosecution claim based on disparate racial impact between prosecutions for crack cocaine and powder cocaine because respondents “failed to show that the
Government declined to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races”).
116. McCleskey, 481 U.S. 297.
117. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
118. Id. at 321.
119. Id. at 317.
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bilities between 1984 and 2002.120 Thirty-two percent of those were
white, 62% were black.121
Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons,122 the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment forbids “imposition of the death penalty on offenders
who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.”123
In so holding, the Court noted the diminished culpability of juveniles
and stated “retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe
penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is
diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”124 According to the Death Penalty Information Center, as of the
end of 2004 (when Simmons was decided) there were seventy-one
people on death row for crimes committed as juveniles.125 Sixty-four
percent were people of color;126 41% were black, and 34% were
white.127 And, in a set of statistics that would be familiar to McCleskey, 71% of the victims whose race was known were white and 28%
were black.128
Reformers seeking to address racial disparity in public defense—
and the criminal justice system more generally—have found success
pursuing claims under other provisions of the Bill of Rights, as long
as those claims are founded in the “liberty” strand of doctrine described above, premised on rights held by all rather than the denial
of a right to some.129 Those who have made the greatest strides in
120. List of Defendants with Mental Retardation Executed in the United States, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/list-defendants-mental-retardationexecuted-united-states (last visited June 29, 2012) (citing Denis Keyes et al., People with
Mental Retardation Are Dying, Legally: At Least 44 Have Been Executed, 40 MENTAL
RETARDATION 243, 243-44 (2002)).
121. Id.
122. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
123. Id. at 578.
124. Id. at 571.
125. Juvenile Offenders Who Were on Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/juvenile-offenders-who-were-death-row#streiboverview (last
visited June 29, 2012) (citing VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH
SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY, 1, 1973 - APRIL 31, 2004 (2004),
available at http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/pdfs/JuvDeathApril2004.pdf).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. This reform work does not even include the on-going effort on behalf of the wrongfully convicted to pursue exonerations largely on the basis of DNA evidence via state statutory claims and federal and state habeas petitions. Poor lawyering at the trial level is
frequently implicated. The Innocence Project, perhaps the most well-known of the organizations pursuing exonerations on behalf of the wrongfully convicted, explicitly identifies
“bad lawyering” as one of the six potential causes of wrongful convictions, The Causes of
Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/
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ensuring the provision of adequate counsel to the people of color most
gravely affected by shortcomings in our indigent defense system and
who have succeeded in protecting the most vulnerable from a death
penalty system riddled with disparate impact, have done so without
reference to race. There is every reason to believe that the reformers
tackling the next frontiers in this type of claim, such as the problem
of mass incarceration in our society, can and will do the same.130
B. School-to-Prison Pipeline, Statutory Claims, and Unconscious
Bias
The “school-to-prison-pipeline”131 is a term used by advocates,
scholars, and reformers to describe the phenomenon by which children are funneled out of the educational system and into the criminal

(last visited June 29, 2014), and notes, “Improving resources for public defense and ensuring the proper training and oversight of all defense lawyers can prevent wrongful convictions.” William Fleener, Staff Att’y, Cooley Innocence Project, Testimony to the Indigent
Defense Advisory Commission, MICH. CAMPAIGN FOR JUST. (Dec. 16, 2011),
http://www.michigancampaignforjustice.org/docs/Fleener%20Testimony%20to%20the%20Indi
gent%20Defense%20Advisory%20Commission%20final.doc; see also SAMUEL R. GROSS &
MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1989–2012 42 (2012), available at http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf (“For 104 exonerations, our information includes clear evidence of severely inadequate legal defense, but we believe that
many more of the exonerated defendants – perhaps a clear majority – would not have been
convicted in the first instance if their lawyers had done good work.”).
And the racial disparity being addressed is undeniable. According to the National
Registry of Exonerations, 1040 people had been exonerated as of the date of this Article.
About the Registry, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited June 29, 2014). Of 802 crimes for which the race
of the defendant was known, 50% of the exonerees were black and 38% were white. See
GROSS, supra note 129, at 31 (noting “[i]t’s no surprise that black defendants are heavily
overrepresented among exonerees: they are heavily overrepresented among those arrested
and imprisoned for violent crimes and drug crimes. But the disproportions we see are
greater than what one would expect.”). The racial disparities were even greater for sexual
assault (63% black versus 32% white), attempted murder (59% black versus 12% white),
robbery (64% black versus 18% white), and drug crimes (60% black versus 10% white). See id.
130. This is not to say that claims based upon the Equal Protection Clause or disparate
impact are dead altogether. The recent challenges to the New York City Police Department’s “stop and frisk” policies and practices, for example, combine classic liberty claims
under the Fourth Amendment with equal protection (and an array of common law tort)
claims. Complaint at 4, 48-49, Ligon v. City of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(No. 12 Civ. 2274 (SAS)), 2012 WL 1031760; Complaint at 2, 40, 42, 50, Davis v. City of
New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10 Civ. 0699 (SAS)), 2010 WL
9937605; Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
and Individual Damages at 2, 34, 36, 42, Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 08 Civ. 01034 (SAS)); see also Opinion and Order at 6, Floyd v. City of
New York, 283 F.R.D. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 08 Civ. 01034 (SAS)) (noting that 2.8 million people were stopped between 2004 and 2009 and that over 52% of those stops were of
blacks, 31% were of Latinos, and 10% were of whites).
131. This phenomenon is also sometimes referred to as “schoolhouse to the jailhouse.”
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justice system.132 The funneling effect of the pipeline can take place
at any number of junctures within the education system and via any
number of different administrative and educational policies and practices.133 Examples of the pipeline at work include overuse of the
school disciplinary system (sometimes through zero tolerance policies) that results in students being kept out of school,134 and referrals
to the criminal justice system for infractions traditionally handled
by schools.135
1. The Disparate Impact
The statistical evidence of the disparate impact the phenomenon
has on children of color is wide-ranging.136 In 2009-2010, the national
graduation rate for black male students was 52% and for Latino
males it was 58%; in contrast, white males graduated at a rate of
78%.137 A recent survey conducted by the Department of Education of
72,000 schools (covering 85% of students nationwide) found that
black students constitute 18% of the student body population, but
35% of the students suspended at least once, 46% of those suspended
more than once, and 39% of those expelled.138 In fact, black students
132. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT
TO JAILHOUSE TRACK 11 (2005).

PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOLHOUSE

133. See, e.g., Emily Chiang, No State Actor Left Behind: Rethinking Section 1983
Liability in the Context of Disciplinary Alternative Schools and Beyond, 60 BUFF. L. REV.
615, 621-22 & nn.23-29 (2012) (describing facets of the pipeline and providing citations);
Dean Hill Rivkin, Legal Advocacy and Education Reform: Litigating School Exclusion, 75
TENN. L. REV. 265, 268 (2008) (discussing schools’ uses of the juvenile justice system as a
disciplinary tool).
134. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 132, at 7; THE C.R. PROJECT AT HARV.
UNIV. & ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING
CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 1 (2000) [hereinafter HARV.
UNIV. C.R. PROJECT].
135. HARV. UNIV. C.R. PROJECT, supra note 134, at 15; CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE
SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 3, 113-14 (2010).
136. See DANIEL J. LOSEN & JONATHAN GILLESPIE, THE C.R. PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES
SUSPENDED: THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF DISCIPLINARY EXCLUSION FROM SCHOOL 6-7 (2012),
available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-rem
edies/school-to-prison-folder/federal-reports/upcoming-ccrr-research/losen-gillespie-opportu
nity-suspended-2012.pdf.
137. THE SCHOTT FOUND. FOR PUB. EDUC., THE URGENCY OF NOW: THE SCHOTT 50
STATE REPORT ON PUBLIC EDUCATION AND BLACK MALES 7 (2012), available at
http://blackboysreport.org/urgency-of-now.pdf.
138. ED Data Express: Data About Elementary & Secondary Schools in the U.S., DEP’T
OF EDUC., http://eddataexpress.ed.gov/state-tables-main.cfm (last visited June 29, 2014)
(select “All States” under section one; then select “Achievement Data” under section three;
then select “Graduation Rate Data”; then select “Display Report” at the bottom of the
page); Michael Harris, New National Data Shows Racial Disparities in School Discipline,
NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH L., http://www.youthlaw.org/publications/yln/2012/apr_jun_2012/
new_national_data_shows_racial_disparities_in_school_discipline/#sdfootnote1sym (last visit-
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were more than three and a half times as likely to be suspended or
expelled as white students.139 More than 70% of students arrested in
school or referred to law enforcement were Hispanic or black.140 Studies also confirm that these disparities cannot be explained by worse
behavior or socioeconomic status.141
These disparities in school discipline rates have consequences beyond the disparity in graduation rates. In an analysis of the data
released by the Department of Education, the Center for American
Progress found:
Students who were suspended or expelled for even one discretionary violation in Texas were 2.85 times more likely than their peers
to be in contact with the juvenile justice system within the following year. Each subsequent violation exponentially increased [a]
student’s chances of juvenile justice involvement—nearly half (46
percent) of students with at least 11 disciplinary actions came into
contact with the juvenile justice system, compared to only 2.4 percent of students with no disciplinary violations.142

In 2009, the arrest rate for juveniles aged 10-17 per 100,000 people was 4,644.3 for whites but 10,096.3 for blacks.143 The Department
of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
notes also that “between 1980 and 2010, the total juvenile arrest rate
decreased 54% for Asians, 51% for American Indians, and 30% for
whites, while the overall rate for black juveniles increased 8% during
this period.”144 Black juveniles constituted 16% of this age group but
51% of arrests for violent crimes and 33% of arrests for property
crimes.145 After they are arrested, black juveniles represent 31% of

ed June 29, 2014). The New York Times analysis of the data noted that in districts with
expulsions under zero tolerance policies, Hispanic and black students represented 45% of
students but 56% of those expelled. Tamar Lewin, Black Students Punished More, Data
Suggests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at A11.
139. Harris, supra note 138.
140. Lewin, supra note 138.
141. See LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note 136, at 32.
142. Rachel Wilf, Disparities in School Discipline Move Students of Color Toward Prison, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/
news/2012/03/13/11350/disparities-in-school-discipline-move-students-of-color-toward-prison/.
143. Juvenile Arrest Rate Trends, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION,
http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05260&text=yes (last visited June
29, 2014).
144. Id.
145. CHARLES PUZZANCHERA & BENJAMIN ADAMS, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ.
PREVENTION, JUVENILE ARRESTS 2009 (2011), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/
236477.pdf.
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referrals to juvenile court and 41% of waivers to adult court.146
In 2008, 37.2% of black men with less than a high school education
were incarcerated.147
As with public defense systems, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
demonstrate that educators and school administrators are intentionally discriminating against children of color.148 Some scholars have
advocated for education reform via the few remaining traditional
desegregation cases stemming from Brown and its progeny.149 While
this strategy would indeed provide plaintiffs seeking to shut down
some aspects of the school-to-prison pipeline with some measure of
relief under the Equal Protection Clause, these cases are exceptions
that prove the rule: few districts remain under desegregation orders
and their issuance depended upon the very discriminatory intent so
difficult to demonstrate today. As a result, reformers have evidenced
little desire to return to the old racial justice paradigm of equal protection litigation to combat the pipeline.

146. THE SENT’G PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 2 (2000), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_reduc
ingracialdisparity.pdf.
147. PETTIT, supra note 2, at 15.
148. See, e.g., Chauncee D. Smith, Note, Deconstructing the Pipeline: Evaluating
School-to-Prison Pipeline Equal Protection Cases Through a Structural Racism Framework,
36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1009, 1026-28 (2009). Smith notes:
[H]istorical and present-day actions that contribute to the pipeline can be categorized into three dimensions—criminalization, sorting, and economic policy.
Together, these dimensions form a structural racism framework that largely
encompasses the dynamic nature of disparate minority student pushout and incarceration. Thus, in contrast to a motive-centered approach, evaluating the
pipeline’s criminalization, sorting and economic dimensions reveals how fragmented inequities have a drastically unequal cumulative impact on students
of color.
Id. at 1026-27; see also Russell J. Skiba et al., African American Disproportionality in
School Discipline: The Divide Between Best Evidence and Legal Remedy, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L.
REV. 1071, 1074 (2009/10) (“A similar analysis in the area of racial disparities in discipline
shows a distinct gap between the scientific knowledge base regarding racial disparities in
discipline and the absence of a legal strategy accepted by the courts to address such disparities. Analysis of case law reveals that this gap appears to be related to the court’s adherence to a colorblind interpretation of the Constitution.”).
149. See, e.g., Danielle Holley-Walker, A New Era for Desegregation, 28 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 423, 426-27 (2012).
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2. The Reform Response150
(a) Claims Under the Equal Protection Clause
There is surprisingly little difference in the outcomes of cases
challenging racial disparities under the Equal Protection Clause in
the imposition of school discipline before and after Washington v.
Davis: claims that succeed involve either (1) a flat-out admission of
racial discrimination or (2) evidence that white students were either
not disciplined at all for the same infractions or disciplined less
harshly. Neither of these elements is easy to come by and claims
based purely upon disparate impact have never had great success.
Both before and after Davis, courts have been satisfied by open
admissions of racial discrimination. In Hawkins v. Coleman, a 1974
case, the Northern District of Texas upheld a claim based upon statistical evidence demonstrating black students were disciplined more
frequently than white students.151 But the school district had been
segregated until three years before the court’s opinion was issued,152
and the superintendent of the school district testified in the case that
the high number of suspensions of black students was because “ ‘we
are a White controlled institution, institutional racism, [and] racism
among individuals.’ ”153 Similarly, in 1985, in Sherpell v. Humnoke
School District No. 5 of Lonoke County, Arkansas,154 the Eastern District of Arkansas ruled in favor of plaintiffs where there was evidence
teachers referred to black students as “niggers,” “blue-gums,” and
“coon.”155 In Mayorga Santamaria v. Dallas Independent School District,156 the Northern District of Texas found in favor of plaintiffs’
150. This Part provides only a brief overview of the reform response to the school-toprison pipeline problem to illustrate the direction reformers have taken away from claims
under the Equal Protection Clause and towards other alternatives. It also omits discussion
of claims for individual relief, e.g. claims brought on behalf of a single child to petition for
services under a statute or to challenge an individual instance of school discipline. For a
much more comprehensive discussion of the reform response, see generally KIM ET AL.,
supra note 135; Frances P. Solari & Julienne E.M. Balshaw, Outlawed and Exiled: Zero
Tolerance and Second Generation Race Discrimination in Public Schools, 29 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 147 (2007).
151. 376 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
152. Id. at 1331.
153. Id. at 1336.
154. 619 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
155. Id. at 673. A teacher in Sherpell also testified she “personally witnessed the discipline of a black child by an administrative official which resulted in broken skin and blood;
that during [her] nine-year tenure, she had not witnessed any white child subjected to such
treatment.” Id. at 674; cf. Coleman v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., 702 F.2d 74, 77 (5th Cir.
1983) (permitting equal protection claim to proceed because “plaintiffs pleaded intent and
purpose to discriminate on the part of the defendants”).
156. No. Civ.A.3:06CV692-L, 2006 WL 3550194 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2006).
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equal protection claim where there was evidence that school administrators had intentionally and explicitly segregated students by race
and national origin.157
Both before and after Davis, courts have required plaintiffs lacking evidence of intentional discrimination to demonstrate not just
statistical disparity in the imposition of discipline, but evidence that
white students were not similarly disciplined for similar infractions.158 And even where some evidence is offered that white students
were not similarly disciplined, courts have been reluctant to grant
relief unless the students are nearly identically situated.159 These
claims are most likely to succeed when there is evidence that two
students involved in a fight were treated differently. For example, in
Payne v. Worthington Schools,160 the (black) plaintiff was given a oneday, in-school suspension and the school merely called the other
(white) child’s parents.161 Similarly, in Antoine v. Winner School District,162 plaintiffs were able to secure a consent decree in part
because they offered not only statistical evidence of disparate discipline but also evidence that Native American students were disci-

157. Id. at *32-39; see also People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Ed. Sch. Dist. #205, 851
F. Supp. 905, 933 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (upholding equal protection claim where school administrators intentionally segregated students).
158. See, e.g., Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[A]bsent a showing
of arbitrary disciplinary practices, undeserved or unreasonable punishment of black students, or failure to discipline white students for similar misconduct, the plaintiffs have not
satisfied their burden of proving that the disproportionate punishment of black students in
the [school district] is the product of a racially discriminatory purpose.”); Sweet v. Childs,
507 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1975) (“There was no showing of arbitrary suspensions or expulsions of black students nor of a failure to suspend or expel white students for similar
conduct.”); Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Ed. Sch. Dist. 61, 78 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815
(C.D. Ill. 2000) ([“Plaintiffs’] statistics failed to establish that any similarly situated Caucasian students were treated less harshly.”), aff’d on other grounds, 251 F.3d 662 (7th Cir.
2001); Collins v. Chichester Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A. 96-6039, 1998 WL 351718, at *6 (E.D.
Penn. June 29, 1998); Parker v. Trinity High Sch., 823 F. Supp. 511, 520 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(“Plaintiffs must show that those who determined the punishment improperly considered
plaintiffs’ race. Stray remarks by nondecisionmakers or remarks unrelated to the disciplinary decision process do not satisfy this burden.”).
159. See, e.g., Tasby, 643 F.2d at 1107 n.1 (noting that “the statistics offered are based
upon a breakdown of offenses far too general to prove disproportionate severity in punishment . . . [and] do not reflect other relevant circumstances surrounding each individual
case of punishment . . . [such as] prior offenses”); Parker, 823 F. Supp. at 520 (refusing to
grant relief in part because evidence that white students were not disciplined for fighting
did “not represent a similar, repeated disregard for the authority of the teachers”).
160. Payne v. Worthington Sch., No. C2-99-830, 2001 WL 506509 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2001).
161. Id. at *8.
162. Consent Decree, Antoine v. Winner Sch. Dist. 59-2, No. Civ. 06-3007 (D.S.D.
Dec. 10, 2007).
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plined more harshly than Caucasian students for participating in the
same fights.163
(b) Other Constitutional Claims
Absent the presence of these particularly egregious indicators of
racial discrimination, reformers have had to rely upon other claims
to combat the school-to-prison pipeline and its effects on children of
color. This Part will focus primarily on the use of statutory claims as
an alternative to the Equal Protection Clause, but as with indigent
defense reform, claims under other constitutional guarantees are
also effective.
Thus, in Antoine v. Winner School District, plaintiffs sought relief
under the Fifth Amendment and successfully obtained a settlement
agreement where school administrators routinely obtained confessions from students that were then used to prosecute them in juvenile court.164 Plaintiffs have similarly invoked the Due Process Clause
to challenge school discipline—most prominently in Goss v. Lopez,165
which resulted in a Supreme Court decision that students have due
process rights at school disciplinary proceedings166—and the Fourth
Amendment to challenge school searches.167
Plaintiffs have also attempted to seek relief under a variety of
common law tort claim theories, including negligence and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, but with only a handful of exceptions,
these claims have largely failed.168 Setting aside the practical difficul163. Complaint at 15, 25, 30, Antoine, No. Civ. 06-3007.
164. Consent Decree at 2-3, Antoine, No. Civ. 06-3007.
165. 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).
166. Id. at 574; see also, e.g., Ruiz v. Pedota, 321 F. Supp. 2d 538, 540-41, 543 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (approving settlement agreement in suit challenging exclusions of students from
school in violation of Due Process Clause); D.C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 879 A.2d 408, 419
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (holding students have right to opportunity to be heard prior to
being transferred to an alternative school and, incidentally, declining to address state
equal protection claim).
167. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374-75 (2009)
(invalidating strip search of student); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to students searched by school officials); Doe
v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d, 349, 356 (8th Cir. 2004) (invalidating mass search of
entire student body); Atlanta Independent School System Officials Will Ensure Students’
Constitutional Rights Are Upheld After Settlement Of ACLU Lawsuit, AM. C.L. UNION (Dec.
16, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/atlanta-independent-school-system-officials-willensure-students-constitutional-right (describing settlement agreement that included end to
searches without reasonable suspicion).
168. See, e.g., Rembert v. Monroe Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. 95-4818 (JEI), 1997 WL
189318, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 14, 1997) (dismissing tort claims as being time-barred); Jackson
v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 1293, 1306 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (dismissing intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim because conduct was not sufficiently extreme or outrageous and negligence claims because of official immunity of defendants).
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ties in making out these claims, such as the need to overcome various
immunity doctrines, the very nature of tort relief is simply ineffective
at combating structural racial inequalities.169
(c) The Statutory Alternative
Reformers have had greater success with claims for statutory
relief, even (or particularly) where their statutory rights are not
explicitly premised on racial equality. Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, for example, prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color, or national origin in programs or activities receiving federal funding.170 But because plaintiffs must still show discriminatory
intent to prevail on a Title VI disparate impact claim,171 such claims
can be nearly as difficult to make out as those under the Equal
Protection Clause.172
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2002,
which requires states participating in a federal funding program
to address disproportionate minority contact (DMC) within the juvenile justice system, has proven somewhat more helpful.173 For example, the Department of Justice and a Tennessee juvenile court (in a
jurisdiction where black children made up 97.8% of all juveniles referred to court) recently entered into an agreement to gather DMC
169. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 90-91 (1978); Richard L. Abel,
A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 809 (1990); Chiang, supra note 133, at 680-82.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006); see also § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting employment discrimination). Plaintiffs filing claims under Title VII are of course still free to allege disparate
impact as a basis for relief, see § 2000e-2(k), and a fair amount has been written about the
relationship between Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly,
Some Runs, Some Hits, Some Errors – Keeping Score in the Affirmative Action Ballpark
from Weber to Johnson, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988) (discussing relationship between Title
VII and equal protection in the context of affirmative action); Richard Primus, The Future
of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1342-43 (2010) (querying whether Title VII’s
disparate impact standard conflicts with equal protection doctrine); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595-96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he war between disparate
impact and equal protection will be raised sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin
thinking about how—and on what terms—to make peace between them.”).
171. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (noting that Title VI prohibits
only intentional discrimination).
172. See, e.g., Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1186-87 (11th Cir. 2001) (dismissing plaintiff’s Title VII claim for failing to prove discriminatory intent in promotion
practices); Barnett v. Johnson City Sch. Dist., No. 3:04-CV-0763, 2006 WL 3423872, at *12
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006) (dismissing claim for failure to show disparate treatment); Brown
v. City of Grand Prairie, No. CIV.A. 3:01–CV–0139, 2002 WL 171728, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan.
29, 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s equal protection claim for failure to prove discriminatory
intent); Jackson, 951 F. Supp. at 1300 (dismissing Title VI claim for failure to prove
discriminatory intent).
173. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22)
(2006).

868

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:835

data to seek alternatives to juvenile detention, to train juvenile court
staff on racial bias recognition and reduction, and to form a plan to
reduce DMC.174
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) contains a number of raceconscious accountability requirements and is explicitly directed at
“closing the achievement gap between high- and low-performing children, especially the achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students, and between disadvantaged children and their more
advantaged peers.”175 Its efficacy as a tool for reform, however, has
been largely limited to the data collection it enables.176 For the first
time, advocates are able to access education statistics disaggregated
by race; although the disparate impact those statistics indicate may
be insufficient for an equal protection claim, knowledge of its existence helps reformers to know they are targeting the right school
or schools.177
Other federal statutes that do not explicitly address race have
proven even more fruitful for litigators. Although there is no one
statute suitable for every school-to-prison pipeline claim, or even
most such claims, and although some claims cannot be addressed by
an existing statute, the statutory landscape is sufficiently rich to
provide a meaningful alternative to the Equal Protection Clause,
particularly when one considers the overlap between the groups targeted for statutory protection and children of color.
The Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA) provides protections for children who do not speak English as a native language.178
Many if not all of these children are children of color, and many suffer from the effects of the school-to-prison pipeline.179 The EEOA re174. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT REGARDING THE
JUVENILE COURT OF MEMPHIS AND SHELBY COUNTY 21-23, 26 (2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/shelbycountyjuv_agreement_12-17-12.pdf. According to the Department of Justice, twenty-three states have full-time, state-level, DMC coordinators; thirty-one states have part-time or other state-level staff designated as DMC coordinators; thirty-four states have invested in targeted local DMC-reduction sites; and twelve states
have laws intended to reduce DMC. JEFF SLOWIKOWSKI, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ.
PREVENTION, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT 3 (Oct. 2009), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228306.pdf.
175. 20 U.S.C. § 6301(3) (2012).
176. Some have criticized NCLB for increasing school incentives to push lowperforming students of color out of schools. See, e.g., Daniel J. Losen, Challenging Racial
Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of the No Child Left Behind Act’s Race-Conscious
Accountability, 47 HOW. L.J. 243, 290-94 (2004).
177. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1907, 115 Stat.
1425 (2002) (requiring states to collect school district data on annual school dropout rates
disaggregated by race and ethnicity).
178. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012).
179. KIM ET AL., supra note 135, at 44.
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quires state and local educational agencies to help children with language barriers overcome those barriers and to provide them with an
adequate education.180 In particular, it mandates that English Language Learner students be provided with an education equal to that
provided to native English speakers and that they be instructed in
English.181 Reformers have filed cases both directly under the EEOA
and through the U.S. Department of Education, Civil Rights Division
to enforce these provisions.182
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),183 section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act,184 and Title II provide an array of protections for students with disabilities.185 Black students are often
over-identified for certain types of disabilities and under-identified
for others.186 Disabled students of color are segregated from mainstream education more often than disabled white students.187 Disa180. § 1703(b), (f).
181. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1011 (5th Cir. 1981).
182. See, e.g., Gomez v. Ill. St. Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1987)
(dismissing equal protection claim for failure to allege intent to discriminate but permitting EEOA claim to proceed); Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1015 (denying Title VI claim for lack
of intent to discriminate but remanding for further proceedings on EEOA claim); Flores v.
Arizona, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1239 (D. Ariz. 2000) (holding that state disbursement of 150
dollars per Limited English Proficient student violated the EEOA by providing insufficient
English instruction for students not proficient in English); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE LEWISTON, ME SCHOOL
DEPARTMENT 3-4 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/Lew
istonAgree.pdf); Letter from March Roosevelt, Superintendent of Pittsburgh Pub. Schools,
to Michael Branigan, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (May 15, 2006) (on file with author) (listing actions district will take to provide required services to Somali-speaking students); see also
Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that failure to take appropriate actions to overcome language barriers is unlawful); Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary Sch. Child. v. Ann Arbor Sch. Dist. Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371, 1390-91 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(holding that school district is obligated to develop a program to assist teachers to take
home language into account in addressing children’s reading problems).
183. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1410 (2012).
184. Pub. L. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)).
185. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2006).
186. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 29TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, 2007 123, 129
(2010) (noting that on average, across all fifty states and the District of Columbia, 1.81% of
black students ages six through twenty-one were labeled mentally retarded, and 1.37%
were labeled emotionally disturbed, whereas white students in that age range were given
those labels nearly three times less often).
187. See, e.g., KIM ET AL., supra note 135, at 54 (“Racial disparities are most pronounced among those students who are educated in regular schools but in settings that are
separate from their nondisabled peers for more than 60 percent of the school day.”). Systematic segregation from mainstream education can also occur when students of color with
disabilities are disproportionately punished with out-of-school suspension. LOSEN &
GILLESPIE, supra note 136, at 12-21 (noting that students of color with special needs “face
double the risk” for suspension compared with their non-disabled peers).
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bled black students are disciplined more frequently and more severely than their white counterparts.188 And disabled black students receive supports and services that are inferior to those given to their
white counterparts.189
The IDEA guarantees children with disabilities a free and appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment and in
accordance with an individualized education plan;190 requires states
to make affirmative efforts to identify children with disabilities;191
prohibits schools from disciplining disabled students without first
establishing that the student’s conduct was not a manifestation of his
or her disability;192 and requires schools to put together a behavior
intervention plan when the misconduct at issue was in fact a manifestation of a disability.193 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 prohibits recipients of federal funding from discriminating on
the basis of disability, and Title II prohibits such discrimination by
public schools and state departments of education regardless of the
receipt of federal funding.194 Advocates have had success filing challenges under a number of these provisions.195

188. See, e.g., KIM ET AL., supra note 135, at 170 n.22 (noting black students represented nearly half of all of the reported suspensions longer than ten days in 2005 for students
with disabilities); DANIEL J. LOSEN & TIA ELENA MARTINEZ, THE C.R. PROJECT, OUT OF
SCHOOL & OFF TRACK: THE OVERUSE OF SUSPENSIONS IN AMERICAN MIDDLE AND HIGH
SCHOOLS 11 (2013) (finding that 36% of all black male students with disabilities enrolled in
middle and high schools were suspended at least once in 2009-2010, compared to 17% for
white males with disabilities, and 6% for white females with disabilities).
189. David Osher et al., Schools Make a Difference: The Overrepresentation of African
American Youth in Special Education and the Juvenile Justice System, in RACIAL INEQUITY
IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 93, 93-116 (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., 2002).
190. 20 U.S.C. §1414 (2012).
191. § 1412(a)(3)(A).
192. 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(c), (e)(1)-(2) (2013).
193. Id. § 300.530(f)(1)(i)-(ii).
194. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2006); Pub. L. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)).
195. See, e.g., Schmelzer v. New York, 363 F. Supp. 2d 453, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying summary judgment under Rehabilitation Act because plaintiffs failed to prove discrimination against disabled children but granting injunctive relief under IDEA); Corey H. v.
Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 995 F. Supp. 900, 918 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (granting injunctive relief under
IDEA for class of disabled children in Chicago); Order Preliminary Approving Settlement,
Directing Notice to the Class and Setting a Hearing on Proposed Settlement, Ray M. v. Bd.
of Educ. of N.Y.C., 884 F. Supp. 696 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (No. 94 Civ. 1103 (EHN)/(JLC))
(providing preliminary approval of settlement in case involving disabled preschool students
who had not been evaluated for special education services in their native language); Settlement Agreement, Kina K. ex rel. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., No. 01-C-0928
(E.D. Wis. Feb. 27, 2008); Settlement Agreement at 1, P.J. v. Conn., Bd. of Educ., Civil
Action No. 291CV00180 (RNC) (D. Conn. filed May 31, 2002) (settling IDEA case that
covered all mentally retarded school-aged children in Connecticut).
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The McKinney Vento Act provides education protections for students who are homeless or in foster care, requiring that: students
who fall under its ambit be permitted to attend either their local
school or school of origin (and be provided transportation if they wish
to stay at their school of origin); such students be permitted to enroll
at a new school even if unable to produce documents such as proof of
residency or medical records; and such students receive services under Title I, Part A, of NCLB.196 Although statistics on the racial composition of homeless students are hard to come by, there is evidence
that children under eighteen form a disproportionate percentage of
the homeless population, which is in turn disproportionately of color.197 Reformers have had success filing claims under the McKinney
Vento Act, particularly in the aftermath of natural disasters such as
Hurricane Katrina.198
3. Beyond the School-to-Prison Pipeline—Lessons for Other
Claims
When statutory relief is available, it is a powerful resource for
advocates seeking to address racial disparities. Reformers in the
school-to-prison pipeline context have had the greatest success when
they have based their claims not on disparate impact, but rather
on statutory rights to which anyone would be entitled—a legislative
equivalent to the “liberty-based claim” referred to by Yoshino
and others.
The statutory and regulatory regime is complex and wide-ranging.
This Part covered only a handful of federal statutes relevant for pipeline purposes, but reformers seeking to address any sort of racial
disparity look to state statutes as well. And even where there is no
private right of action under a particular statute, the history of
school-to-prison pipeline reform demonstrates that relief may nevertheless be available through work with government agencies or
branches leveraging the statutory entitlements.

196. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(g)(1)(J)(iii)(I), (g)(3)(C)(i), (g)(4)(A)-(B) (2006).
197. See, e.g., Who Is Homeless?, NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS (July 2009),
http://nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/who.html (noting that in 2003, children under eighteen comprised 39% of the homeless population and that a survey of twenty-five cities in
2006 indicated that the sheltered homeless population was 42% African-American).
198. See, e.g., Order at 1-2, Boisseau v. Picard, Civil Action No. 07-00565 (E.D. La. Jan.
7, 2008) (dismissing case following settlement of claims on behalf of children made homeless by Hurricane Katrina); see also Permanent Injunction at 1, Bullock v. Bd. of Educ. of
Montgomery Cnty., Civil Action No. DKC02CV798 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2005) (enjoining school
district to permit homeless children to attend any school in the feeder system for the school
the student attended prior to homelessness, and to provide transportation services).
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Where explicitly race-based statutory protections are available,
reformers do and should make use of those protections. For example,
the ACLU’s Racial Justice Project recently sued Morgan Stanley for
the disparate impact its sub-prime lending practices had on people of
color in Detroit, relying primarily on the federal Fair Housing Act
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which prohibit racial discrimination in residential real estate and credit transactions.199
But the availability of federal statutory relief for claims based on
racial disparity in the absence of discriminatory intent appears to be
on the wane. Indeed, lower court skepticism about the substantive
merit of claims under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (an Act
grounded in the Fifteenth Amendment and containing protections
explicitly designed to protect racial minorities),200 has recently given
way to a Supreme Court decision that holds section 4 of the Act unconstitutional.201 This Part catalogs some of the ways one group of
reformers has attempted to address this problem and urges those
who have not previously considered racially neutral statutory claims
to do so.
C. Immigration, Structural Arguments, and Racial Animus
Over the last decade, a number of states and localities have crafted legislation designed to discourage undocumented workers from
entering their jurisdictions and to encourage those already present to
leave. The bills passed typically contain some combination of the following provisions:202 prohibitions on transporting or concealing un199. Class Action Complaint at 1-3, Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, No. 12 CIV 7667(HB),
2013 WL 3835198 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2012). The case survived a motion to dismiss. Adkins
v. Morgan Stanley, No. 12 Civ. 7667(HB), 2013 WL 3835198 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2013).
200. See, e.g., South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(upholding South Carolina Voter Identification Act under section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act); Florida v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d 299, 321-22, 353 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying
claim that change in voting procedures would have retrogressive effect on minority voters
in violation of Voting Rights Act and finding procedures were not enacted with discriminatory purpose); Perez v. Texas, 891 F. Supp. 2d 808, 834-35 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (denying claim
that congressional redistricting constituted impermissible racial gerrymander in violation
of Voting Rights Act). But see Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 143-44 (D.C.C. 2012)
(denying motion state request for declaratory judgment that voter identification law did
not violate the Voting Rights Act), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013).
201. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, No. 12-96, slip op. at 24 (U.S. June 25, 2013). In so holding,
the Court repeatedly emphasized its view that minority voters no longer suffer any disparate impact as a result of state and local voting laws. See id. at 4 (“Census Bureau data
indicate that African-American voter turnout has come to exceed white voter turnout in
five of the six States originally covered by §5, with a gap in the sixth State of less than one
half of one percent.”).
202. This list is by no means comprehensive. According to the National Conference on
State Legislatures, lawmakers in forty-six states and the District of Columbia introduced
948 bills and resolutions related to immigration, and enacted 114 of those bills and adopted
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documented workers,203 inducing an undocumented worker to enter
the state,204 and/or hiring an undocumented worker;205 requirements
related to documentation immigrants must produce or can use to
verify the lawfulness of their presence in the jurisdiction;206 providing
for additional state penalties for violating federal law;207 and/or authorizing local law enforcement to determine whether a person is
removable or detainable under federal law.208 This Part will explore
92 of those resolutions in the first half of 2012 alone. This flurry of activity actually marked
a decline from 2011. 2012 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States (January 1 – June 30, 2012), NAT’L CONF. ON ST. LEGS. (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/immig/2012-immigration-related-laws-and-resolutions.aspx.
203. See, e.g., Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165 (June 21, 2010) (prohibiting the harboring of an illegal alien); H.R. 87, § 7, 151st Gen. Assemb., 2011 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011) (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-200 (West 2014)) (prohibiting the transport or movement of
an illegal alien “for the purpose of furthering the illegal presence of the alien in the United
States” and the concealment or harboring of an illegal alien); H.R. 56, § 13, 2011 Reg. Sess.
(Ala. 2011) (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-13(a)(1), (3) (2014)) (prohibiting the concealment, harboring or shielding from detection of any alien, as well as transporting an alien
“in furtherance of the unlawful presence of the alien”); S. 20, § 4, 119th Gen. Assemb., Sess.
(S.C. 2011) (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-460 (2014)) (making it a state crime for unlawfully present persons to shelter, harbor or transport themselves).
204. ALA. CODE § 31-13-13(a)(2) (2014); H.R. 87, § 7 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11202(b) (West 2014)) (prohibiting people from inducing an illegal alien to enter into Georgia).
205. ALA. CODE § 31-13-11(a) (2014) (criminalizing an unauthorized alien’s application
for, solicitation of, or performance of work); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (2014)
(making it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in the
state); Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165, § 5(C) (June 21, 2010) (requiring employers to
execute an affidavit that they have not knowingly employed any unauthorized aliens); S.
20, § 2 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-14-10(9) (2014)) (creating sanctions on employers
who knowingly hire unauthorized aliens).
206. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2014) (requiring officers in some circumstances to verify immigration status when conducting a stop, detention, or arrest); H.R. 87, § 8
(codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-100(b) (West 2014)) (authorizing but not requiring state
officials to conduct inquiry into immigration status); S. 590, § 18, 117th Gen. Assemb., First
Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011) (codified at IND. CODE § 34-28-8.2-2 (2013)) (making it an infraction to
knowingly offer or accept a consular identification card as a valid form of identification).
207. ALA. CODE § 31-13-10(a) (2014) (also making failure to comply with federal alien
registration requirements a state misdemeanor); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (2014)
(making failure to comply with federal alien registration requirements a state misdemeanor); S. 20, § 5 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-740 (2014)) (also making failure to comply
with federal alien registration requirements a state misdemeanor).
208. ALA. CODE § 31-13-12(a) (2014) (requiring officers to determine immigration status when officer has reasonable suspicion a lawfully seized individual is unlawfully present); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883(A)(5) (2014) (authorizing local law enforcement to
arrest without a warrant a person “the officer has probable cause to believe . . . has committed any public offense that makes the person removable from the United States”); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-5-100(e) (West 2014) (authorizing local law enforcement to detain unauthorized aliens, to transport them to a detention facility, and/or to notify the Department of
Homeland Security); S. 590, § 19 (codified at IND. CODE § 35-33-1-1(a)(11), (12), (13) (2013))
(authorizing officials to make warrantless arrests of individuals when the officer has a
removal order issued by an immigration court, a detainer or notice of action issued by the
Department of Homeland Security, or the officer has probable cause to believe the person
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the traditional equal protection claims available to combat any disparate racial impact these bills may have and identify the nontraditional legal challenges reformers have brought to bear in lieu of,
or in addition to, equal protection claims.
1. The Disparate Impact
Setting aside the facial classifications on the basis of citizenship or
alienage presented by these bills, this type of legislation also presents
the type of racial disparate impact problem in which this Article is
primarily interested. The reform response to these bills is animated
largely by a suspicion that their enforcement will disproportionately
target undocumented people of color, and more broadly, all persons
who look Latino, regardless of actual ethnic heritage or legal status.209
A number of these immigration bills contain provisions calculated
to inoculate the laws from traditional equal protection challenges by
specifically prohibiting consideration of race, color, or national origin
except as authorized by state and federal constitutions, and by requiring that implementation be consistent with federal laws governing civil rights.210 They explicitly disavow discriminatory intent and
thus seek to foreclose any cause of action via Washington v. Davis.
Although there may be some atmospheric evidence of discriminatory
intent, reformers seeking to combat the anticipated racial disparate
impact have had to think beyond the Equal Protection Clause.211

has been indicted for or convicted of one or more aggravated felonies); Fremont, Neb. Ordinance 5165, § 4(D) (June 21, 2010) (requiring city police to verify immigration status of
building occupants who have not declared themselves to be U.S. citizens and to revoke
occupancy licenses for unauthorized aliens); S. 20, § 6 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13170(A) (2014)) (requiring officers to determine immigration status when there is reasonable
suspicion a person being stopped or arrested is present unlawfully).
209. See, e.g., State Anti-Immigration Laws, AM. C.L. UNION, http://www.aclu.org/
immigrants-rights/state-anti-immigrant-laws (last visited June 29, 2014) (“Laws inspired
by Arizona’s SB 1070 invite rampant racial profiling against Latinos, Asian-Americans and
others presumed to be ‘foreign’ based on how they look or sound.”).
210. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B), (L) (2014); H.R. 87, § 8 (codified at GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-5-100(d) (West 2014)), 2011 Ga. Laws 794, 805.
211. See, e.g., Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1192-93 (M.D.
Ala. 2011) (stating that legislative history shows discriminatory intent behind Alabama
immigration laws).
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2. The Reform Response
(a) Facial Classification Based on Alienage
As a whole, immigration-related bills, like problems with state
public defense systems and the school-to-prison pipeline, have not
proven particularly amenable to equal protection challenges.212 The
bills largely target undocumented immigrants, who do not qualify as
a protected class and thus receive only rational basis review under
traditional equal protection analysis.213 To the extent that advocates
have attempted to make claims based upon disparate racial impact,
they have been foreclosed by the problem at the heart of this Article:
the requirement of discriminatory intent.214
The legislation has presented reformers seeking to combat racial
disparity with some low-hanging fruit, however. First, unlike the
previous two types of state action described, the immigration-related
bills sometimes present a facial classification based upon alienage
(citizenship), which is a protected class entitled to heightened scrutiny.215 Discrimination on the basis of citizenship or nationality is often
inextricably linked with discrimination on the basis of race. Second,
although state action involving the classification of undocumented
adult aliens receives only rational basis review, it still must survive
at least that minimal level of scrutiny.216 And finally, the undocumented children of undocumented aliens may qualify for some additional protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.217
At least some of the bills in question have proven vulnerable on
each of these fronts. It is worth noting that although these successful
claims rely on the Equal Protection Clause, they rely on a raceneutral aspect of the Clause. In Buquer v. Indianapolis,218 for example, the court found that a provision barring use of consular identification cards as valid identification did not satisfy rational basis review under equal protection analysis because it was “designed simply

212. See, e.g., Keller v. City of Fremont, 853 F. Supp. 2d 959, 975 (D. Neb. 2012) (rejecting equal protection challenge to various immigration related bills because city articulated
a rational basis for the different treatment afforded adults who are lawfully present and
those who are not).
213. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
214. See, e.g., Keller, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 982 (holding plaintiffs failed to state a claim
based upon disparate impact, because they failed to show discriminatory intent).
215. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
216. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-25.
217. Id. at 216-17.
218. 797 F. Supp. 2d 905 (S.D. Ind. 2011).
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to target foreign nationals.”219 Similarly, in Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Governor of Alabama,220 the Eleventh Circuit
found that a state requirement that elementary and secondary
schools determine the immigration status of students violated Equal
Protection because the asserted state interest in collecting such information was insufficiently compelling and would impermissibly
burden the right of such children to obtain an education.221 In Ruiz v.
Robinson,222 the Southern District of Florida found unconstitutional a
state law that denied in-state tuition benefits to U.S. citizen students
who could not prove the federal immigration status of their parents.223 The court reasoned that the facial classification upon which
the statute rested (between U.S.-citizen students who could provide
immigration papers for their parents versus those who could not)
required heightened scrutiny because it punished citizen children for
the acts of their parents and that the classification failed to survive
that level of scrutiny.224
(b) Federal Preemption
The most successful across-the-board line of attack on these types
of bills has been a structural argument that these provisions are
preempted by federal law. The state legislation described follows a
long history of anti-immigrant legislation in this country, at least two
previous waves of which the Supreme Court has also dealt with on
federal preemption grounds.225 This time around, the Court ruled in
Arizona v. United States that three of the four key Arizona immigration law provisions were federally preempted.226 State and local laws
may be preempted in one of three ways: express preemption, in which
Congress explicitly withdraws specified powers from the states via
statute; field preemption, in which Congress determines that an entire area of the law must be regulated by the federal government exclusively; and conflict preemption, in which compliance with both the
219. Id. at 924.
220. 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012).
221. Id. at 1246-49.
222. 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
223. Id. at 1333.
224. Id. at 1331.
225. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69 (1941) (finding state-imposed alien
registration requirements to be federally preempted and noting that “[o]ur Constitution
and our Civil Rights Act have guaranteed to aliens the equal protection of the laws which
is a pledge of the protection of equal laws” (quotation marks omitted)); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (finding California statute that required bond payment by
certain foreign passengers to be federally preempted).
226. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012). Arizona, of course, rests firmly on the shoulders of
precedent like Hines. See generally Hines, 312 U.S. 52.

2014]

THE NEW RACIAL JUSTICE

877

state law and the federal law is impossible.227 In the context of immigration, the Court has often emphasized the traditional federal power
to determine immigration policy and the extensive way in which
Congress had already done so, occupying the field.228
In Arizona, the Court held that the state could not make “willful
failure to complete or carry an alien registration document” a state
misdemeanor because Congress had occupied the entire field of alien
registration.229 It found the state could not prohibit aliens from applying for or soliciting work because Congress had already enacted a
“comprehensive framework for ‘combating the employment of illegal
aliens.’ ”230 And it found that the state could not deputize state law
enforcement officials to arrest anyone who they had probable cause to
believe had committed an offense that would make them removable
from the United States because “[f]ederal law specifies limited circumstances in which state officers may perform the functions of an
immigration officer.”231
In the wake of the Court’s decision, lower courts have found a
spate of laws patterned upon those struck down in Arizona to be
preempted on similar grounds.232
(c) What Remains: Disparate Impact and a Return to the Bill of
Rights
The Court’s opinion in Arizona essentially deferred decision on the
fourth provision of the Arizona bill, which requires state officials to
make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of
anyone stopped, detained, or arrested if there is reasonable suspicion

227. See generally Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500-01 (summarizing basic preemption principles).
228. Id. at 2498-99 (“It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned about the
status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States must be able to confer
and communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States.”).
229. Id. at 2501-02 (“[E]ven complementary state regulation is impermissible. Field
preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area,
even if it is parallel to federal standards.”).
230. Id. at 2504.
231. Id. at 2506. For discussion of the fourth provision of the Arizona legislation, which
the Court permitted to survive, see infra Part III.C.2.c.
232. See, e.g., Ga. Latino Alliance for Hum. Rts. v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250,
1266-67 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012);
Keller v. City of Fremont, 853 F. Supp. 2d 959, 973 (D. Neb. 2012). Of course, some lower
courts had already invalidated similar provisions as being preempted even before the
Court’s decision was announced. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers
Branch, 675 F.3d 802, 817 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. South Carolina, 840 F. Supp.
2d 898, 917-24 (D.S.C. 2011); Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 F. Supp. 2d 905, 920 (S.D.
Ind. 2011).
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that the person is an unlawfully present alien.233 Lower courts confronted by similar provisions have likewise withheld judgment.234 The
Court has also refused to find preempted state statutes that require
use of the federal E-Verify program to ascertain the work authorization status of employees.235
Advocates seeking to challenge these two types of state action—
immigration status checks conducted by state law enforcement officials and use of E-Verify to check work authorization status—must
look beyond preemption. Both of these types of legislation are facially
neutral but raise potential disparate impact concerns that workers of
certain races will be disproportionately subject to immigration or
work authorization checks. If the enforcement of these provisions is
sufficiently egregious with regard to racial impact, there is some
precedent for further challenge under equal protection, but such
claims are very difficult to make out.236
What remains, instead, is a return to the use of constitutional
protections other than the Equal Protection Clause to vindicate racial
inequality claims.237 Justice Alito acknowledges this eventuality in
Arizona: “If properly implemented, [the show-your-papers provision]
should not lead to federal constitutional violations, but there is no
denying that enforcement of [the provision] will multiply the occasions on which sensitive Fourth Amendment issues will crop up.”238
Some state provisions have in fact already been deemed unconstitutional on Fourth Amendment and due process grounds. For example, in Buquer v. City of Indianapolis,239 the Southern District of In233. Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182, slip op. at 23-24 (U.S. June 25, 2012). The
Court, it seems, did not see fit to take the invitation of a previous Court’s decision in Hines
to deem such provisions similarly preempted by an implicit Congressional desire “to leave
[aliens] free from the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might
not only affect our international relations but might also generate the very disloyalty
which the law has intended guarding against.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941).
234. See, e.g., Ga. Latino Alliance, 691 F.3d at 1268; Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1292. But
see South Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 924 (finding state equivalent immigration status
check requirement preempted).
235. Chamber of Com. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) (upholding the Legal
Arizona Workers Act of 2007, which permits state courts to suspend or revoke business
licenses if an employer knowingly or intentionally employs an unauthorized alien and
requires use of the federal E-Verify program).
236. It appears the Court has not struck down a restriction purely on the grounds of
discriminatory enforcement since Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
237. See supra Part III.A.2.
238. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2529 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); cf. Hines, 312 U.S. at 71 n.32 (“The requirement that cards be
carried and exhibited has always been regarded as one of the most objectionable features of
proposed registration systems, for it is thought to be a feature that best lends itself to
tyranny and intimidation.”).
239. 797 F. Supp. 2d 905 (S.D. Ind. 2011).
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diana granted a preliminary injunction that enjoined enforcement of
a state law provision authorizing state and local officials to conduct
warrantless arrests of individuals with outstanding federal removal
orders. In addition to the usual preemption problems the provision
presented,240 the court found that the provision violated the Fourth
Amendment because it authorized arrest for non-criminal offenses
and left a “deafening silence as to what happens to the arrestee post
his arrest.”241
3. Beyond Immigration—Lessons for Other Claims
The immigration cases demonstrate that even where the racial
animus is all but explicit, reformers still gain the most traction from
racially neutral claims. This observation holds true within the more
limited family of equal protection claims as well: even when the raceneutral claim is based on a factor linked to race (like citizenship),
race-neutral equal protection claims are more likely to succeed than
race-based claims. These cases may indicate that the more racially
inflammatory the underlying facts, the more important it is to rely
upon racially neutral legal claims. They also show, however, that
there is life yet in the Equal Protection Clause and that reformers
need not shy away from equal protection claims where they do exist,
as in facial classifications on the basis of alienage.242 And finally,
these cases serve as a powerful reminder that disparate racial impact
may sometimes productively be challenged on multiple fronts.
Reformers have made use of federal preemption in other contexts
as well. In a case related to the anti-immigration legislation, the Supreme Court recently struck down an Arizona proposition that required prospective voters to present documentary proof of citizenship
in order to register to vote.243 So-called “voter ID” laws like this one
have a disproportionate impact on people of color,244 who are less like240. Id. at 920.
241. Id. at 918; see also id. at 918-19 (“There is no mention of any requirement that
the arrested person be brought forthwith before a judge for consideration of detention or
release. There is in fact a complete void within the new statute regarding all other due
process protections.”).
242. Cf. Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 939, 1012-17 (1995) (arguing that the Court’s equal protection alienage cases
are actually driven by preemption concerns).
243. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2260 (2013) (finding
proposition preempted under the National Voting Rights Act via the Elections Clause).
244. A number of laws seeking to restrict access to voting were passed or proposed in
the months leading up to the 2012 presidential election. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
VOTER PROTECTION PROGRAM, Segregating American Citizenship: Latino Voter Disenfranchisement in 2012 3-4 (2012), available at www.advancementproject.org/page/-/resources/
Latino%20Report%202012.pdf (summarizing laws).
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ly than whites to have government issued identification.245 In a twist
on the use of federal preemption principles, the Court relied not
upon preemption under the Supremacy Clause, but rather under the
Elections Clause, which gives Congress the power to make or alter
state regulations governing the time, place, and manner of holding
federal elections.246
The Court’s decision is all the more interesting in light of the
claim that the Ninth Circuit denied, under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, which provides explicitly race-based relief.247 The Ninth
Circuit noted the need for plaintiffs seeking such relief to demonstrate that the voting practice being challenged actually results in
race discrimination, with a causal connection between the practice
and the discriminatory result.248 It found that plaintiffs failed to provide evidence demonstrating even the disparate impact alleged.249
Here, racial justice was again better served by the race-neutral structural protections of federalism and federal preemption than by the
explicitly race-based protections conferred by federal statute.
Finally, courts across the country have dealt with a variety of cases involving disparate racial impact, immigration, and/or allegations
of racial animus in the post-9/11 cases. As in the other areas of law
examined by this Article, the disparate racial impact implicated by
these cases is relatively clear; the U.S. Government has focused almost exclusively on Muslims and predominantly Muslim countries in
an effort to prevent future terrorist attacks, and largely on Middle

245. See, e.g., NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, VOTER ID LAWS & THE NATIVE VOTE: STATES OF
CONCERN 4, available at http://www.ncai.org/attachments/PolicyPaper_LaOnRbIuKyazjpiz
LTzOsFxvRiBpmwxxbGVFOeCNGMFwEuLZXwz_VoterIDs_NativeVote_States_of_Concern.pdf
(discussing the disparate impact voter ID laws have on Native Americans, noting, for example,
that many tribal communities do not have street addresses); JON C. ROGOWSKI & CATHY J.
COHEN, BLACK YOUTH PROJECT, TURNING BACK THE CLOCK ON VOTING RIGHTS: THE
IMPACT OF NEW PHOTO IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ON YOUNG PEOPLE OF COLOR 1
(2012), available at http://research.blackyouthproject.com/files/2012/09/Youth-of-Color-andPhoto-ID-Laws.pdf (focusing on effect of voter ID laws on young voters who are of color);
WENDY R. WEISER & LAWRENCE NORDEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., VOTING LAW CHANGES
IN 2012 24 (2011), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/page/Democracy/VRE/
Brennan_Voting_Law_V10.pdf (noting that “as many as 25% of African-American voters do
not possess a current and valid form of government issued photo ID, compared to 11% of
voters of all races”).
246. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2257.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) (prohibiting states from imposing voting qualifications
that “result[] in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color”).
248. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 405 (9th Cir. 2012).
249. Id. at 407.
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Eastern citizens and countries.250 Those seeking to challenge directly
the racial justice implications of racial profiling or special registration requirements, however, have met with little success when relying on claims driven purely by equal protection.251 Race-neutral
claims, brought under the writ of habeas corpus, due process, and/or
federal statutes or treaties, have proven more fruitful.252
IV. CONCLUSION
The scenarios of racial inequality discussed above were neither
intentionally created by a racist government cabal nor the result of
bad state actors engaged in intentional discrimination. They arose,
instead, out of what some scholars have identified as structural racism: the development of social institutions over time, through myriad
government choices and actions.253 The resulting structural inequality is impossible to eradicate via the elimination of a single government policy or targeted firings of racist employees.
This new racial injustice is difficult, if not impossible, to combat
under the Court’s reading of the Equal Protection Clause, which requires the ill intent of a bad government actor, that is, the racist government employee. It requires, moreover, a structural solution. While
much of contemporary equal protection scholarship has focused on
how to extend the protections of the Equal Protection Clause to new
groups like lesbian women and gay men, this Article returns to the
paradigmatic application of the clause to prohibit classifications
based upon race.254 It offers an exploration of the many ways reform250. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ST., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 2
(Sept. 2006), http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/71803.htm (describing counter-terrorism
strategy and focusing on threat from radical Islamists in the Middle East).
251. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682-83 (2009) (dismissing complaint for
failing to allege facts showing petitioners “purposefully adopted a policy of classifying postSeptember-11 detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, or national
origin”); Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 438-39 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying equal protection
challenge to special registration requirements that applied only to adult male citizens of
Muslim majority states and North Korea because there was a rational national-security
basis for the program).
252. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (holding that aliens held
as enemy combatants were entitled to habeas corpus hearings to challenge their detentions); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (finding proposed military commissions violated Uniform Code of Military Justice and did not satisfy Geneva Conventions);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537-38 (2004) (requiring that citizen held as enemy
combatant be given meaningful opportunity to contest his detention pursuant to the Due
Process Clause).
253. See supra note 42.
254. This includes, of course, Yoshino’s article. Yoshino, supra note 9; see also Ball,
supra note 58, at 9-12 (discussing liberty and equality based claims in context of gay
rights); Tribe, supra note 48.
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ers have found to fill the gaps wrought in the Equal Protection
Clause by Davis and its progeny, and it demonstrates that reformers
largely (and long ago) abandoned explicitly race-based claims, relying
instead on other guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights, statutory
claims, and federal structural arguments.
This Article is largely a descriptive project. It takes as a given
existing Court doctrine and recognizes—as reformers working on the
ground already have—that different paths can be taken to achieve
equality. But this description of today’s fight for racial equality helps
to illuminate what equality more generally might resemble in the
coming years, and whether and to what extent the Equal Protection
Clause will even be relevant.
Facially neutral policies with a disparate racial impact will likely
be a fact of life for some time. The continued vitality of the Equal
Protection Clause has perhaps never been in greater question, not
just for race, but for other groups seeking equality as well. The hardfought lessons racial justice reformers have learned over the years
may soon be relevant for others seeking to challenge disparate impact claims. This Article seeks to demonstrate that government policies creating such impact are not beyond the reach of the law. The
workarounds identified herein do not present a solution to every racial inequality—sometimes a political solution may be more appropriate. But where a judicial fix is feasible, these workarounds point
the way towards a new racial justice.

